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The Status of an Annulled Marriage
in Montana
I. INTRODUCTION
It would seem that predictability in the law is no where
more to be desired than in that determining the consequences
of an annulled marriage, both as to the status of the principals
in the action and of any offspring resulting from the union in
the meantime. Yet, that law, with some of the related law
upon which it is dependent, has been much neglected in the mass
of litigation reviewed by the Montana State Supreme Court As
expressed in our Codes it is in a very unsatisfactory condition.
It will be the province of this study to try to put some degree
of definiteness in the law of annulment, and in those portions
governing marriage, particularly pertinent to that principal
inquiry. But to understand the present law, an understanding
of the origins of some of its more peculiar doctrines is imper-
ative.
II. ORIGINS OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOID
AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Perhaps it is not too much to say that the shades of Henry
VIII's notorious marital struggles with the Catholic Church
still arise to haunt the law of marriage and annulment in Mon-
tana in this year of our Lord, 1943. Since shortly after the
Norman Conquest, the ecclesiastical courts had assumed ex-
clusive jurisdiction over both marriage and divorce." Through
those courts the question of the validity or invalidity of a pur-
ported marriage was covered by the Canon Law, which con-
'A Montana Supreme Court decision, handed down only last fall lends
current interest to "void and voidable" marriages: In re Shun T. Ta-
kahashi's Estate (1942) ........ Mont ......... , 129 P. (2d) 217. The Court
affirmed the order of the lower court in rejecting the petition of Viv-
ian Takahashi, a member of the white race, who sought to establish
her right to letters of administration as the widow of Shun T. Ta-
kahashi, a Japanese alien. The decision ruled that she had no right
whatsoever as the deceased's wife, under R. C. M. 1935, §5702,
declaring a marriage between a white person and a Japanese person,
"utterly null and void," even though the couple had lived together un-
interruptedly since 1915, when they went through a marriage ceremony
In the state of Washington, and the validity of the marriage had nev-
er been questioned during the husband's lifetime. But this fairly ob-
vious result does not quite pose the problem presented by the interpre-
tation of the statutes providing for the annulment of a marriage in
Montana, the question here considered.
'l1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE (6th
ed. 1881) §§49-50.
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sisted of the pertinent decrees of the various Popes, modified
in some cases by local ecclesiastical rules! The canonical law,
in turn was based on the supposed Biblical prohibitions against
marriages between persons of certain natural and legal' rela-
tionships, known as the "Levitical Prohibitions," found in the
Eighteenth Chapter of the Book of Leviticus. The secular
courts were supposed to know nothing of the canonical law
and so, to have no jurisdiction to pass on the validity of a mar-
riage alleged to violate those prohibitions, known as the "can-
onical impediments." However, the secular courts did have a
partial control over marriages in that they considered them
as a simple contract.' Hence each party to the marriage con-
tract had to meet the conditions generally required of a simple
contract. Blackstone tells us that the following three require-
ments were regularly imposed by these courts: 1. The parties
must be of the age of consent, which was twelve years for the
girl and fourteen for the boy; 2. They must have mental ca-
pacity to contract; 3. They must have consented in fact.' If
'L. R. A. 1916C 690; 1 BIsHoP, op. cit. supra note 2, §§51 and 106.
4The legal relationship disqualifying intermarriage is "affinity," de-
fined as, ".... the relationship which arises from marriage between a
husband and his wife's kindred, and vice versa . . ." SCHOULER. LAW
OF THE DoMEsnc RELATIONS, (3rd ed. 1882) §16. This writer
declares that, "No question has been discussed with more earnestness
in both England and America, with less positive result, than (this
one) ... in England such marriages are still deemed incestuous, and
within the prohibition of God's law, and the House of Lords resists
all legislative change in this respect." Loc. cit. The absence of genet-
ical reasons for such prohibitions raises a strong suspicion that such
rule Is a glaring example of an archaic survival of outmoded law.
Fortunately such prohibitions do not exist in Montana. Also see:
BIsHOP, op. cit. 8upra note 2 §107, p. 87 n. 2.
'1 BLAcKsToiqFs COMMENTARIES (Am. Ed. 1771) 433. Such statement
assumed that there actually was more to a marriage, but considered
it beyond the temporal courts' power to go beyond the contracts as-
pects of the relation. Though generally recognized today as a statusfounded on a contract, many courts have taken Blackstone's aphorism
much too literally, forgetting that it originally took the ecclesiastical
and common laws combined to reveal Its full dimensions. Cf. 1
BIsHoP, op. cit. supra note 2, §3 ff; SCHOULEI, Op. Cit. supra note
4, §13. R. C. M. 1935, §5695 very properly defines marriage as the
relation (status) which arises out of a contract.
61 BLAcKSToNz's COMMENTARIES (Am. Ed. 1771) 435-9. Blackstone
cites a fourth incapacity, actually created by statute, a few years be-
fore he first wrote, however. At his writing, any marriage by one
less than twenty-one without parental consent was made entirely void
by 26 Geo. II c. 33 (1752), though the age of consent still was twelve
and fourteen respectively. Various of the causes at present deemed
to give rise to "voidable" marriages are not expressly mentioned by
Blackstone at this point, but are implicit therein. Thus both fraud
and force, involve the efficacy of the contract, so deemed essentially
a civil impediment. On the other hand, whether some modern impe-
diments are civil or canonical, In the sense that the ecclesiastical
2
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any one of these requirements was missing the secular courts
were free to declare the marriage absolutely void. Indeed, if
it were shown that there was a want of contract for one of
these reasons, the common law ruled the marriage of absolutely
no effect, subject to collateral attack, as never having existed
at all."
It is alleged that, at this point, the Church, through its
own courts developed the practice of greatly expanding the
canonical impediments beyond the Levitical Prohibitions, so as
to increase Church revenues by granting special dispensations
for a price. Had it been clear that such expansion of can-
onical jurisdiction encroached upon the established jurisdic-
tion of the law courts, the latter could have enjoined such ac-
tion.8 But in this instance, the temporal courts, supposedly
knowing nothing of the spiritual law of marriage, were in no
position to challenge the propriety of the ecclesiastical courts'
conduct in thus broadening the field of impediments. So, in
a celebrated act of Parliament,' Henry VIII proceeded, first
to limit the canonical law for impeaching marriages, to the
Levitical degrees, "the farthest of which is that between uncle
courts would grant relief therefor, give rise to some dispute. Appar-
ently some of them at least were either or both. Though regularly
described as a canonical impediment, physical incapacity may be
deemed to affect the consensual element of the contract as well as the
"sacrament." 9 R. C. L., Divorce and Separation, §36; 35 AM.
JUR., Marriage, §120; 1 BISHOP, Op. cit. supra note 2, 92. All of these
authorities declare in substance that, "Capability of consummation is
an implied term of the marriage contract," seemingly making it a civil
impediment. Nevertheless, it is described as a voidable canonical impe-
diment. The church likewise might feel free to relieve for either fraud
or force as directly affecting its recognized province over moral con-
duct. Cf. 1 BISHOP, Op. Cit. ,upra note 2, 140 ff., particularly at 177,
with 76 A. L. R. 779. The former declares that force makes a mar-
riage utterly void; the latter says that, "No case is found where the
element of fraud or duress has been held to nullify a marriage con-
tract."
'1 BLAcKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (Am. Ed. 1771) 435-6; 1 BISHOP, Op.
cit. supra note 2, 269; L. R. A. 1916C 690.
'This power of prohibition in the temporal courts is supposed to have
originated in a charter or statute issued by William the Conqueror
himself. 1 BISHOP, op. cit. 8spra, note 2, §50, and authorities cited
therein.
'32 Henry VIII (1540) c. XXXVIII. In the preamble to this Act,
Henry VIII recites the following grievance against the "Bishop of
Rome": "Whereas the bishop of Rome hath always intangled and
troubled the meer jurisdiction and regal power of this realm of Eng-
land . . .by his usurped power in them, as by making that unlawful
which by God's word is lawful, both in marriage and other things ...(and) hath so continued the same, whereof yet some sparks be left,
which hereafter might kindle a greater fire, and so remaining, his
power not to seem utterly extinct.. ." This suggests that the Act may
have been a definite part of a general program to curtail the power of
the Pope. If so, the ghosts of that struggle, do indeed still haunt us.
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and niece,"" and secondly, to empower the temporal courts to
enjoin any action by the ecclesiastical courts attempting to
void any marriages valid by that statute. However, the civil
court had no jurisdiction to pass upon the status of a "mar-
riage" within the admittedly prohibited degrees. Such "mar-
riage" could be attacked only by a direct proceeding before
the spiritual courts maintained during the lives of both the
principals thereto. Until an adverse ruling by the spiritual
court, such marriages were "presumed to be valid."" Hence,
those marriages which might be questioned only in the spir-
itual courts came to be deemed "voidable" only, while those
defective because of a lack of some civil capacity to contract
were deemed void and of no force or effect whatsoever. But,
once the spiritual court entered a decree of "nullity" the mar-
riage was deemed void ab initio. Notice that the sense in which
the word "voidable" is here used is very different indeed from
its ordinary meaning in contract law,1" where it would have no
retroactive effect. However, in marriage law, a nullity decree
has the retroactive effect of establishing that the marriage,
though "voidable" only, never existed in contemplation of the
law-putting it thereafter into the same category as a void
marriage. As Bishop well puts it, "The children, before legit-
imate, become illegitimate; and the late husband is treated as
having never acquired any right to the property of the
wife...
Obviously this very peculiar meaning given the word
"voidable" is an historical accident flowing from the mutual
limitation and partial conflict of jurisdiction existing between
the ecclesiastical and the temporal courts." Hence, wherever
"Harrison v. State (1863) 22 Md. 468. 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES
(Am. Ed. 1771) 435; 2 COKE'S INSTITUTE (London 1809) 683; SCHOUL-
Ft, op. cit. suprco note 4, 28 n. 2.
"Although writers today quite generally speak of a voidable marriage
as "valid" until annulled, at the common law, historically, that is not
quite accurate. Actually, its so-called validity was predicated on a
presumption only, that could be overthrown only in a direct proceed-
ing. An annulment supposedly established that it never existed in
fact.. Cf. Note: The Effect of Annulnent of Marriage in New York,
30 CoL L. REv. (1930) 877, n. 1.
"'1 BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 2, §§104 ff. Bishop recognized that the
former clear cut distinctions between civil and canonical impediments
indicated by the terms "void" and "voidable" no longer exist. For ex-
ample, nonage, except below seven, is only voidable, yet civil; fraud
and duress likewise have a civil basis, yet actually are treated as giv-
ing rise to a personal privilege only. 1 BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 2,
§153. See note 6 supra.
'Ibid, §118.
'4If the law court originally could have administered canon law, canon-
ical impediments almost certainly would have produced a wholly void
4
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this very special conflict of jurisdiction did not exist, as in the
United States, where the ecclesiastical courts were never es-
tablished, the courts might well have never recognized the
"voidable" marriage at all. Its continued existence is very
hard to justify, either on principle, or on policy grounds.'
Nevertheless, although there is little uniformity or exact-
ness in their usage for this purpose,"6 American courts long
marriage In exactly the same way as lack of contractual capacity. It
was simply because of the law courts' refusal to recognize canonical
impediments as a basis for attacking collaterally a given marriage
that produced the very peculiar characteristic of a voidable marriage.
See ScHouILR, op. cit. &mapra note 4, §14. Cf. 76 A. L. R. 769, 770,
suggesting that it was the Church's lack of interest in protecting prop-
erty rights that caused the distinction between "void" and "voidable"
marriages to develop.
2"This statement directs its attention to the "retroactive effect" of the
common law voidable marriage, only. There may be good reason to
require either party, even to 8on intrinsically void marriages to sub-
mit to a judicial determination of its voidness before taking advantage
of that fact, although generally, a void marriage produces no legal
consequences whatsoever. Indeed, as will be shown shortly, the Mon-
tana Code seems to give precisely that treatment to at least two types
of void marriages. But cf. Harrison v. State (1863) 22 Md. 468, 85 Am.
Dec. 658, where the court assumes that provision for the "annul-
ment" of a void marriage would be useless and nugatory, and that,
therefore, such marriage must be voidable in the common law sense,
even though It was expressly declared void by statute.
'Few words probably show to better advantage the extreme ambiguities
inherent in a large portion of our legal concepts than do the words
"void" and "voidable." An early New Hampshire case, State v. Rich-
mond (1853) 26 N. H. 232, 237, reveals remarkable perspicacity in an-
alyzing the confusion resulting from these two terms. In a suit not
involving marriage law, the Court states that, "There is in our books
great looseness, and no little confusion in the use of the terms 'void'
and 'voidable,' growing perhaps in some degree out of the imperfection
of language. There are at least four kinds of defects which are in-
cluded under these expressions, while we have but those two terms to
express them all ... I. Proceedings may be wholly void, without force
or effect as to all persons and for all purposes, and incapable of be-
ing or being made otherwise... II. Things may be void as to some
persons and for some purposes, and, as to them, incapable of being
otherwise, which are yet valid as to other persons and effectual for
other purposes. As a deed, executed by an idiot... may be void as to
the idiot, and yet binding as to the others. An Instrument in form of
a deed, but without a seal, may be void as a conveyance, and yet be
binding for some other purposes. III. Things may be void as to all
persons and for all purposes, or as to some persons and for some pur-
poses, though not as to others, until they are confirmed. But though
said to be void, they are not so in the broadest sense of that term, be-
cause they have a capacity of being confirmed, and after such con-
firmation they are binding. For this kind of defect our language af-
fords no distinctive term. . . (As a girl less than twelve entering a
marriage ceremony-of no effect uutil she affirms upon reaching
twelve.) IV. Contracts and proceedings are properly called voidable,
which are valid and effectual until they are voided by some act. Primafacie they are valid, but they are subject to defects, of which some
person has a right to take advantage .... ." To this list should be
5
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since seized upon this special significance of the "voidable"
marriage, and have purported to make it the cornerstone of
the law of annulment in the United States. So, if we assume
that the Montana Code is merely declaratory of the common
law (and it is susceptible of such interpretation) it must fol-
low that no legal consequences are to be attributed to any
marriage annulled under R. C. M. 1935, Section 5729-30, set-
ting forth the causes for and persons entitled to request an
annulment. Apparently, it is assumed both by the legal pro-
fession and by our courts that such is the consequence of an
annulment. The Montana Supreme Court has so stated in
very strong dictum.1' So, at this point, the shades of Henry
VIII do arise to rattle the bones of illegitimacy (and produce
numerous other malodorous consequences) in the skeleton
closet of our State polity.
Though it is necessary to know something of the early
common law governing annulment and of the origins of a
"voidable" marriage, in order to interpret correctly any Amer-
ican statute on the subject, it would be a most grievous error
merely to assume that our Code is simply declaratory of the
common law." This fact is well stated in an annotation:
". .. notwithstanding some knowledge of the old or
added a fifth variation of meaning, the voidable marriage at common
law. Cf. L. R. A. 1916C 690, 692. In trying to point out the confusion
of these terms as applied in marriage law, it repeats the first three
meanings above given, as being represented in marriage law. Actually,
It is doubtful that the second meaning finds an illustration in mar-
riage law. Further, it does not note that the meaning of a common
law voidable marriage is not covered by the first three-nor that
meaning number "IV" Is illustrated in marriage law by the statutorily
modified "voidable marriage." Of course, the confusion in these terms
runs the gamut of the entire law. Witness the legal consequences va-
riously attributed to Irregular corporate action.
"State ex rel. Wooten v. District Court (1920) 57 Mont. 517, 522, 189 P.
233, 235: "Although It thus appears that up to 1895 the successive leg-
islative assemblies of this state did not recognize the fact, there is a
clear distinction between actions for the annulment of a marriage on
pre-existing grounds and those for the dissolution of such a contract
for acts committed after its solemnization. The first recognizes but
a ceremonial, or formal contract, and repudiates the idea that there
ever was In fact a marriage between the parties, and the decree of the
court, when made, declares the marriage null and void ab initio... "
"The ecclesiastical law was deemed a part of the common law, in a
broader sense, and the latter phrase is here used to include that part
of it now surviving as an integral part of our law. Prudham v. Phil-
lips, 1 H&Ao. LAw TRLcrs, 456, note; Reg. v. Millis, 10 Cl. & F. 534,
671; 1 BrSHop, op. cit. supra note 2, §§56 ff. Bishop puts it thus:
"Of the several branches of the common, or unwritten, law of Eng-
land, there is one called the ecclesiastical law; . . .To the branch of
the common law called ecclesiastical, the subJect of marriage and di-
vorce, in England, pertains. . . " Ibid. §57.
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common-law test as to void and voidable is essential . . . the
statutes of both England and America have greatly modi-
fied the ancient law, and in many instances entirely oblit-
erated the distinction between canonical and civil disabilities
.. since certain marriages voidable by the old law are now
absolutely void by force of statute, and certain marriages
void by that law may be valid or else voidable merely, the
changed effect . . . renders it advisable to discuss each im-
pediment or disability separately.'
It is submitted that the Montana Code providing for annulment
is one of the most striking of numerous statutes intending to
modify the common law so as at least generally to treat an an-
nulled marriage as non-existing only from the date of the decree,
thus making the children of such marriage legitimate after as
well as before the decree, and giving the parents all the benefits
of a "dissolved" marriage. This conclusion is supported by the
history of that Code; by its present form; and by authorita-
tive precedent interpreting it.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FIELD
AND THE MONTANA CIVIL CODES
A. Early Montana Law
Interestingly enough, the earliest legislation treating of an-
nulment and divorce in Montana, apparently intended that any
distinction between the two theretofore existing should be wiped
out. At any rate it included both causes existing at the time
of the marriage and those arising thereafter as grounds for
granting a divorce.' Whether from design, or ignorance, that
early legislation has this definite effect upon our law of annul-
ment: rather than starting Montana with the pure common law
of annulment, so as to place the burden on those seeking to prove
a change in the common law, it seems that we started with a
repudiation of the common law type of annulment, so that the
burden may be said to be on those insisting that the common
law attributes of annulment must now be imposed upon those
affected by such a proceeding.' Enacted in the First Legislative
"L. R. A. 1916C 690, 692.
2'BANNACK'S CODE (Acts, Resolutions and Memorials, Ty. of Mont. 1st
Legis. Assem. 1864) 430. Actually, in the early common law, the only
absolute divorce granted was for causes existing at the time of the
marriage. The divorce a tinculo is the ancient counterpart of an an-
nulment proceeding, and was granted only on the theory that no mar-
riage ever had existed in fact. 1 Co. IAtt. (Thomas 1818) 123 ff; AM.
JuR., Marriage, §60.
"Several states provide for divorce for antenuptial causes, clearly
treating such proceedings as dissolving the marriage, rather than de-
creeing that such marriage never existed: Bennett v. Bennett (1910)
7
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Session, 1864-5, the above law was supplanted by the Civil Code
of 1895, adapted from the laws of California. The latter's Civil
Code, in turn, was largely the Field Code," first adopted in
California in 1872.
B. Analysis of the Field Code
That the Code Commissioners responsible for the Field Code
determined to eliminate all the anomalous and anachronistic
hangovers found in the common law, admits of little doubt. In-
deed, establishing that fact is the burden of most of the intro-
duction to the Field Code, as well as the Commissioners' report
to the New York Legislature which had appointed them. In an-
swer to the objection sometimes advanced against a written code,
that it is not possible to provide for all future cases, they reply
that even though every individual case cannot be anticipated,
nevertheless,
"... To cast aside known rules which are obsolete, to
correct those which are burdensome, or unsuitable to present
circumstances, to reject anomalous or ill-considered cases,
to bring the different branches into a more perfect order
and agreement, may be of immense value, though we cannot
look beyond the present, to make provision for what has
never yet appeared. "'
169 Ala. 618, 53 So. 986; Selby v. Selby (1905) 27 R. I. 172, 61 A. 142;
Note: Consequences of the Annulmenwt of a Voidable Marriage (1929)
43 HARV. L. Rav. 109, 112. Some states even have provided for the di-
vorce of a void marriage: Gulick v. Gulick (1879) 41 N. J. L. 13. And
see Rawdon v. Rawdon (1856) 28 Ala. 565. Others have provided that
a cause producing a void marriage at common law, should only give
rise to a right to secure a "divorce" with the children legitimate even
thereafter.
'The "FiEu CODE" was the product of one of two Commissions ap-
pointed by the New York Legislature, originally in 1847, in pursuance
of provisions contained in the State Constitution of 1846, stipulating
that the laws of New York should be codified. These were the Code
Commission and the Practice Commission. The latter promulgated,
submitted and had accepted in substance, Codes of Civil and of Crim-
inal Procedure. The Code Commission, however, had a turbulent ca-
reer. Several of its appointed members refused to serve, and, after
being established for sometime, it was abolished. Finally, in 1857, Win.
Curtis Noyes, Mr. Alexander W. Bradford, and Mr. David Dudley
Field were appointed commissioners. Very able lawyers, their labor
precipitated a tremendous debate over the relative merits of statutory
and common law. Of the three Codes--Political, Penal and Civil-pre-
pared and submitted by them to the New York Legislature, the Civil
was the last. Though never formally adopted by the New York Leg-
islature it substantially expressed the then existing New York civil
law. It was enacted as law in California in 1872, and in Montana in
1895, as well as in several other western states, with more or less mod-
ification.
'FIELD CODE (Albany 1865) Introduction XVI.
8
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Again, after enumerating a large number of examples in the law
of contracts and of agency wherein the established law was alto-
gether contrary to the universal understanding of persons enter-
ing into such transactions, the Commissioners continue:
"... Yet upon each of these points the common law
holds otherwise, and has obstinately refused for hundreds
of years to accommodate itself to the undoubted intentions
of the parties whose right it determines .... Thus it is, that
by the present Code, not only are the particular anomalies
rectified, which have just been mentioned, but by sections
801, 802, 809, 811 and 1829, the details of the law of con-
tracts are made subordinate to the intentions of the par-
ties.... ''
These are supposed to be typical only of changes made in the
common law. To insure the avowed purpose of eliminating all
common law rules originating in historical accident, or no longer
serving any conceivably useful purpose, they first point out that
the judicial practice of insisting that any statute in derogation
of the common law is to be strictly construed, has been one of
the worst curses of that law's administration,' and then express-
ly provide that, "The rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed, has no application to
this code. '" Surely, with these pronouncements in mind, we
might well expect the Commissioners to examine carefully-and
very critically-the entire common law of annulment, with a
view to substantially modifying it. Its treatment of "void" and
"voidable" marriages is illuminating.
In considering the law of marriage, the Code rejects en-
tirely the term "voidable" in the marriage and annulment field,
substituting instead, these contrasting descriptions: "void from
the beginning" and "void from the time its nullity is ad-
judged." It provides that consanguinous marriages and big-
amous marriages celebrated within five years of the disappear-
ance of the spouse of either party, should be void from the be-
ginning.' On the other hand, it declares that,
"If either party to a marriage is incapable of consent
for want of age or understanding, or is incapable from
physical causes, of entering into the marriage state, or if the
consent of either is obtained by fraud or force, the marriage
is void from the time its nullity is adjudged by a competent
tribunal. "
24Ibid. at XXVIII, XXX.
-Ibid, at XXV, XXVI.
§2032.
"§40.2§39.
9
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It also provides that a bigamous marriage, even, should be "void
only from time its nullity is adjudged. . . .," if
"Such former husband or wife was absent and not known
to such person to be living for the space of five successive
years immediately preceding such subsequent marriage.. . '"
The phrase "voidable marriage" at the common law was fully
understood by these Code Commissioners.' If they had intend-
ed to retain its meaning unmodified, it is strange indeed that
they did not use it, since it was used generally at that time to
mean a marriage that was presumed to be valid but became void
ab initio upon an annulment decree. The very careful change
in the terminology, in view of the antiquated meaning of "void-
able" particularly, strongly suggests that the Code intends to
prevent an annulment from operating retroactively. Another
straw blowing in that direction is the fact that the Field Code
combines "annulment" provisions and those for the dissolution
of a marriage into one chapter under the single heading "Di-
vorce. '
The Field Code names seven causes for granting an annul-
ment, two of which concern minority, however.' In general
these two are combined as a single cause in the present Montana
Code. With that modification these provisions are retained al-
most verbatim in R. C. M. 1935 and will be examined in extenso
infra. These provisions are followed immediately by an express
declaration that the offspring of marriages annulled for two of
2§40(3).
"hese men were thoroughly familiar with BLACKSTONE, who makes
quite clear the peculiar difference between a void and a voidable mar-
riage at common law. The first edition of BISHOP'S competent treat-
ment of marriage and divorce was published in 1864. Moreover, the
Commissioners were profound legal scholars and very probably were
familiar with much of the ecclesiastical law, directly.
"This formal arrangement still is retained in the California Civil Code,
and so appeared in the Montana Codes until 1921. CALIF. CIV. CODE
(Deering 1937) Pt. III, Title I, Ch. II, Art. I and Art. II; R. C. M.
1907, Pt. III, Title I, Ch. II, Art. I, Art. II. Since 1921, each divisible
subject appears in independent chapters, without further division than
in sections. Annulment appears in Chapter 5 of the Civil Code, and
Divorce in Chapter 6. Of course, formal editorial classification of the
law is not supposed to be of controlling significance in its interpreta-
tion. Nevertheless, it is some evidence of the effect to be given an-
nulment, intended by the original Code Commissioners in the Field
Code. Cumulatively, it is persuasive evidence. Moreover, it demon-
strates that annulment and divorce are not necessarily fundamentally
different.
'FIEL CODE (Albany 1865) §54 (1), (3). The first stated cause Is for
either person being under the age of legal consent, twelve and four-
teen respectively, set forth in §36. The third stated cause Is for the
female being under fourteen in the absence of consent of the person
having legal charge of her.
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the enumerated causes, a presently living prior spouse, or in-
sanity of either party,
"are entitled to succeed in the same manner as legitimate
children to the estate of the parent, who at the time of the
marriage, was competent to contract."
To the present, the evidence presented that the retroactive op-
eration of an annulment is eliminated by the Field Code, ad-
mittedly has not been conclusive. However, the manner in
which it expressly provides for the offspring of these two mar-
riages, positively deemed void at the common law, does seem to
have almost that effect. It appears that such special provision
was made as to an annulment for these two reasons, because of
the fear that they would be thought void from the very begin-
ning, notwithstanding contrary intimations in the Code, be-
cause they were so absolutely void by common law doctrines-
an inherent lack of contractual capacity supposedly existing in
each case. Probably nothing was said about the children of oth-
er annulled marriages simply because the Code's framers thought
they had made it so clear that these marriages were to be deemed
valid until annulment, with the latter having no retroactive op-
eration. When we add to these sections, the Code's treatment of
the question of who shall have the custody of the children of
marriages annulled for fraud or force, the conclusion that these
marriages (and so all voidable marriages) are perfectly valid
marriages, subject only to dissolution for a cause existing at the
marriage, becomes almost irresistible. It declares that their cus-
tody must be awarded to the innocent parent." Ordinarily,
there would be no question of who has custody of illegitimate
children. The mother, as the natural parent and guardian has
sole custody at common law. Indeed, we find the Code saying
as much in another section.' The most natural if not the only
way to harmonize these two Sections is to conclude that the chil-
dren of these voidable marriages are permanently legitimate
by virtue of their parents' marriage only.
C. Modifications in the Montana Code
With the following modifications,TM the provisions of the Field
-Ibid. §56.TIbid. §57.
-Ibid. §91.8 Only those Field Code sections bearing particularly on the status of
annullable marriages, and the possible difference between them and
void marriages, have been mentioned above. Others pertinent to this
study will be compared from time to time with corresponding Mon-
tana Code sections discussed. The modifications in the Montana Code,
at this point, refer to the Field Code sections already summarized.
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Code, just outlined, survive in Montana's present Code: 1. As
to marriages incapable of consummation for physical causes, or
because of force or fraud, it declares that they shall be "void-
able,'"' (perhaps by interpretation) substituting that word for
"void from the time its nullity is adjudged by a competent tri-
bunal". 2. It does not say that "want of age" alone, produces
a voidable marriage, though it does permit an annulment for that
reason, plus lack of parental consent.' 3. The Montana Code
also specifies the blood relationships between whom marriages
are prohibited, thus expanding the collateral line against which
the prohibitions are levied, but retaining the phrase "void from
the beginning," to describe the effect of such attempted mar-
riages.' It also expands the class of "marriages void from the
beginning," or "utterly null and void," by so declaring if eith-
er is feeble-minded, or if a white person marries one either of
the black or the yellow race." 4. It also declares by special
provision, apart from annulment, that if a marriage is void eith-
er party may have the same so declared by the district court.'
5. And, finally, it contains a provision in Chapter 80 of the
Civil Code, on "Succession," rather than in the Chapters on
domestic relations, declaring that, "The issue of all marriages
null in law, or dissolved by divorce, are legitimate," apparently
originating in the California Code.' Since the provision last
mentioned is not an integral part of the Code on marriage and
does not help very much in interpreting those chapters, perhaps
it would be well to dispose of it at this point, briefly.
This provision appears in many state statutes, and there is
much authority for the proposition that it standing alone, makes
legitimate for all purposes the offspring at least of marriages
subject to annulment. This much seems clearly established."
Whether it does more and legitimates the issue of marriages
"void from the beginning", is another and much more difficult
question. Though beyond the scope of this immediate study, it
may be said that while considerable language is found in the
cases affirming that such is the effect of this Section," the va-
-1R. C. M. 1935, §5698.
"Ibid. §5729(1).
'Ibid. §5699.
4Idid, §§5700-02.
4Ibid. §5728.
"Ibid. §7074.
"Graham v. Bennet (1852) 2 Cal. 503; In re Shipp's Estate (1914) 168
Cal. 640, 144 P. 143; Hartwell v. Jackson 7 Tex. 576; 84 A. L. R. 499
and cases there cited.
"Graham v. Bennet, supra; Hartwell v. Jackson, 8upra; Copeland v.
Copeland (1918) 73 Okla. 252, 175 P. 764; Watts v. Owens (1885) 62
Wisc. 512, 22 N. W. 720; 84 A. L. R. 499 and cases there cited.
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lidity of such generalization is questionable." These cases quite
generally do not involve miscegenous nor consanguinous mar-
riages.' Though the legitimacy of the offspring of the mar-
riages particularly involved in this study seems assured, the
present question is broader than that: "Do all the legal inci-
dents normally flowing from marriage issue from an annullable
marriage even after its annulment?" This Section, alone, hardly
can be taken as any evidence of legislative assumption that an
annulment does not affect the rights normally flowing from a
marriage, i.e., that it should operate just like a divorce in this
respect. Indeed, it may be most plausibly argued that this Sec-
tion expressly maintaining one of the incidents of a lawful mar-
riage, seeks to save something that otherwise would be lost by
the annulment rather than being merely declaratory of what
would exist anyway. So we must look elsewhere, for evidence
that an annulment has no invalidating retroactive effect on the
marriage.
"There is abundant- authority for the proposition that the Section covers
more than merely statutorily ammnlube marriages; In re Shipp's Es-
tate (1914) 168 Cal. 640, 144 P. 143, applies it to a marriage for ir-
regular ceremony, where one of the parties believed it to be binding,
but it left open the question of whether some "marriages" were not
covered by the Section: "There may be some question whether the
enactment applies to the offspring of marriages which are declared by
the Code to be "illegal and void," or "void from the beginning," such
as incestuous marriages. . . , marriages of whites with negroes....
or (under certain conditions), marriages between persons one of whom
is already married... " Admitting this much, there is a real difficulty
in excluding any purported marriages. One criterion for excluding
some such marriages is based on the "good faith" of at least one of
the parties. If wholly void and good faith not present it is not a mar-
riage at all under the statute: Stripe v. Meffert (1921) 287 Mo. 366,
229 S. W. 762; Sisney v. Sisney (1928) 132 Okla. 90, 269 P. 349. That
good faith in a bigamous marriage is not necessary: Harris v. Har-
ris (1887) 85 Ky. 49, 2 S. W. 549.
"5An apparent exception is Re Estate of Billie Atkins (1931) 151 Okla.
294, 3 P(2d) 682, which rules that the children of a marriage between
an Indian and a negro were legitimate, though apparently the Court
assumes that the marriage was void under their statute making it un-
lawful and criminal for a negro to marry one of any other race. But
the case is not controlling for two reasons: 1. Mixture of Indian and
negro blood was extremely common in parts of Oklahoma. Notwith-
standing the wording of the Code, there was no real public objection
to it. The annotation in 84 A. L. R. 499 ff. recognizes the necessity of
considering each cause of voidness separately. 2. This was not neces-
sarily a void marriage in Oklahoma. Though the Court says nothing
of it, Hunt v. Hunt (1909) 23 Okla. 490, 100 P. 541 declared that,
though a marriage was unlawful and criminal, it was not, for that
reason void. The statute does not expressly make this marriage void.
Contra, Re Walker (1896) 5 Ariz. 70, 46 P. 67; Greenhow v. James
(1885) 80 Va. 636, 65 Am. Rep. 603. In re Atkins, supra, the dissent
relies on the Virginia cases, trying to tie up the Oklahoma law with
Virginia's historically, but the miscegenation statutes are different,
and Oklahoma actually modelled her Code after California's.
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To the present we have spoken as though a "voidable mar-
riage" and an "annullable marriage" were one and the same
thing under our Code. That language is justified by the com-
mon law. If it be justified by our Code, it then follows that no
annulled marriage relates back. As already stated, however,
there has been such statutory scrambling of the void and the
voidable marriage, that it is extremely important that we ex-
amine each impediment separately. For example, though the in-
cestuous marriage was only voidable at common law, not be-
cause less objectionable, but because it was amenable only to
the ecclesiastical courts, it now is declared to be "void from the
beginning". On the other hand, though nonage sometimes was
described as causing a "void" marriage originally, it may be
argued that it is not even voidable under our Code. So it seems
necessary to examine more closely the six statutory grounds for
annulment, to determine their status in the law. However, the
Section formally introducing Chapter 5 of the Civil Code, on
"Annulling Marriage," must be given some preliminary atten-
tion-more than it ordinarily receives.
IV. CHARACTER OF "MARRIAGE" COVERED BY
R. C. M. 1935, Section 5728
That Section, mentioned briefly supra, reads thus: "Either
party to an incestuous or void marriage may proceed by action
in the district court, to have the same so declared."' Although
originally appearing as a separate article in the preceding Chap-
ter on "Marriage,"' apparently the editors for R. C. M. 1921
thought that this Section properly was only an introductory
statement of the general law governing the annulment of mar-
riages. That this is not true seems evident both from the basic
distinction between "incestuous or void" marriages and "void-
able" marriages under our Code as well as at the common law,
and from the history of this particular Section. It was men-
tioned above that our Code declares either that both incestuous
and miscegenous marriages and marriages between a feeble-mind-
ed person and another shall be "void from the beginning," or
-'R. C. M. 1935, §5728.
"This provision was added to the California Code by way of amend-
ment in 1875, three years after that state adopted the Field Code.
CAi. Crv. ConE (Deering 1937) Pt. III, Title I, Ch. I, Art. III, §80.
The law of annulment appears in Chapter II, Article I. It appeared
in the same form in the Montana Codes until R. C. M. 1921 when it
was shifted into the chapter on annulment as an introductory section,
where It appeared with its present section numbering.
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that they shall be "utterly null and void.' "" Authority is legion'
that such marriages have no legal force or effect whatsoever;
may be collaterally attacked at any time; and that either party
may conduct himself in every respect as a single person. It
takes no judicial declaration to release either party. Its exist-
ence may be attacked after either or both parties are dead. 1 To
such purported marriages does Section 5728 direct itself. Hence,
a proceeding thereunder, merely establishes a more convenient
and formal proof of an already existing fact. This interpreta-
tion is supported by the fact that it even yet appears as a sep-
arate article under the preceding Chapter in the California
Code.' In distinguishing the proceeding under this Section from
an annulment, a California case describes the former thus:
"A marriage prohibited as incestuous or illegal and de-
clared to be "void" or" void from the beginning" is a legal
nullity, and its invalidity may be asserted or shown in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material.
The provision of section 80 (R. C. M. 1935, Section 5728)
that an incestuous, or void marriage may in an action to
that end be declared void does not undertake to make such
action the exclusive method of questioning the validity of
the purported marriage. The judgment merely declares an
existing fact-viz., that the marriage is void-and this fact
may be shown even though it may not have been so adjudi-
cated. "'
Such construction raises the very interesting question of
just what form such proceeding should assume. One authority
says that this Section simply offers "declaratory relief.'"' As
"R. C. M. 1935, §§5699-5702.5' In re Shun T. Takahashi's Estate (1942) ........ Mont ......... , 129 P(2d)
217, 222; 76 A. L. R. 770; 1 BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 2, §105.
"In re Shun T. Takahashi's Estate, supra.
'2CAL. Cir. CODE (Deering 1937) Pt. III, Title I, Ch. 1, Art. III, §80. In
terms of the form of the relief granted-simply declaration of an ex-
isting fact-there is a much greater difference between this proceed-
ing and an annulment, than there is between an annulment and a di-
vorce. This Section was adjudicated for the first time in 1934, in Cal-
ifornia. Apparently counsel are using it with increasing frequency, to
avoid the possible objection of unclean hands in an annulment suit,
where the one originally acting in bad faith now wants to avoid: Sul-
livan v. Sullivan (1934) 219 Cal. 734, 28 P (2d) 914; Anderson v. An-
derson (1936) 7 Cal. App. (2d) 265, 60 P (2d) 290; Brandt v. Brandt
(1939) 32 Cal. App. (2d) 99, 89 P (2d) 171: "Where a married person
remarries without obtaining a divorce, the court as a matter of pub-
lic policy, at the first opportunity, will enter decree annulling the sub-
sequent marriage"; Brill v. Brill (1940) 38 Cal. App. (2) 741, 102 P
(2d) 534. Otherwise, the proceedings seem to have been essentially
an annulment.
'In re Gregorson's Estate (1911) 160 Cal. 21, 116 P. 60, 62.
"16 CAL JUR. 927 and 935. This authority takes pains to point out that
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an original question it seems that the basic character of the in-
terest declared by the court, would justify a strictly ex parte
proceeding if available in Montana,' simply affirming the al-
leged individual status of the petitioner. All of this is not to
say that the free use of such proceeding should be encouraged
even in this instance. It often is recognized that in any proceed-
ing challenging a purported marriage both parties should be
present if practicable.' But the question still remains of the
limits of the court's power to take jurisdiction where it may
prove impossible or impracticable to give the other party any
an annulment is different from that provided for under §5728: "...
The action (annulment) is distinct from an action under §80 (R. C. M.
1935, §5728) of the Civil Code to have an incestuous or void marriage
judically declared void, as it does not relate to marriages void in the
extreme sense, except as subdivision 2 of §80 of the Code may cover
void marriages..." Ibid. §28, p. 935.
Actually, it is not clear that the "ex parte proceeding" is sufficiently
recognized as part of Montana's Procedural Code for the Court to per-
mit its use here. According to R. C. M. 1935, §8996 there are only two
forms of judicial remedies: 1. Actions: 2. Special proceedings. As
these remedies are defined in §§8997, 8998, and 9834-5, the ex parte is
not included in either class, because apparently the Code assumes that
there are necessarily always involved party litigants. Notwithstand-
ing this statutory silence on the ex parte proceeding, however, there
are numerous proceedings which the Montana courts readily entertain,
essentially ex parte in character. Wherever such proceeding appears
to be a necessary incident to powers expressly given the courts, it is
assumed that proceeding must be available. For example, the district
courts are authorized to entertain petitions for naturalization; for the
probating of wills and for the appointment of administrators, all of
which originally, at least, are ex parte. Probably, an assignment for
the benefit of creditors also assumes that character. So, if the Court
becomes sufficiently impressed with the real character of the "rem-
edy" under §5728, it should have no difficulty in taking action there-
under, ex parte. Finally, in a real sense, an ex parte proceeding may
be considered not a judicial remedy, so that in defining the latter,
there would be no reason for including a definition of the former.
(The argument here presented, as to the essential character of the
proceeding under §5728, does not imply an approval of the rule allow-
ing either party to attack any purported marriage without judicial au-
thorization. The desirability of the entire theory of voidness, allow-
ing collateral attack, is open to question. Assuming such theory of
voidness, the view stated herein, simply is based on the logical appli-
cation of that concept, plus apparent legislative intent in enacting this
Section.)
"If a court is determined to require that the other party be subjected
to process in all cases, it may seize on the word "action" used in §5728,
and conclude that, since that word is statutorily defined as to include
always the enforcement of a right against another, a proceeding under
this section necessarily is a two party suit. The problem is not quite
that simple, however, because whatever it is called, the basic character
of the interest asserted is not conceived of as the enforcement of any
right against another, but simply the declaration of an individual
status. It remains possible, though, for the Court to interpret this
word as expressing an intention that the proceeding involved should
be treated as an action.
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kind of notice, when the petitioner offers to submit ample proof
of the voidness by affidavit. A very recent Montana decision
goes far to support the conclusion that it should take jurisdic-
tion. In affirming the issuance of letters of administration to
the public administrator, against the petition of the white
"wife" claiming as surviving widow of a deceased Japanese
alien, the Court in that case declares:
"The marriage was void and ineffectual for any lawful
purpose in this state. It is open to collateral attack in any
proceeding wherein the question of its validity may be
raised, whether before or after the death of either or both
of the parties. . . .The marriage was wholly nonexistent,
and there was no occasion ever for any proceeding to have
it annulled... ,
The answer to the objection that there is a lack of due process
to such proceeding in that the rights of the other party are
abridged without an opportunity to be heard, is that such other
person is not affected in any way by this order, since the latter
is not res judicata his rights, because he is not privy to such
proceeding."
If the majority view that,' although the forum may take
jurisdiction for divorce by substituted service on the defendant,
it can acquire jurisdiction to grant an annulment only by per-
sonal service within the jurisdiction, be operative in Montana
the distinction between the "declaratory relief" granted under
Section 5728 and annulment becomes of even greater importance.
However, it seems to be the practice in at least some district
courts in the State to utilize the same process in an annulment
proceeding as for a divorce. And if this paper's thesis is adopt-
'
7In re Shun .T. Takahashi's Estate (1942) ........ Mont ........, 120 P. (2d)
217, 222.
"Many cases approve the following definition of an e.T parte proceed-
ing: ". . . (it) is a proceeding had on application of one party only,
and for his benefit only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any
persons adversely interested." Ez porte City of Ashland (1934) 256
Ky. 384, 76 S. W. (2d) 43, 45; State v:; Cox (1913) 87 Ohio St. 313,
101 N. E. 135, 138. Hence, the other party should be able to proceed
at any time under R. C. M. 1935, §5727 which provides that if one party
denies a marriage, "the other may proceed by action in the district
court, to have the validity of the marriage determined and declared."
If the object of this action is to establish the exi tence of the mar-
riage, it Is a two party proceeding.TShafe v. Shafe (1935) 101 Ind. App. 200, 198 N. E. 826, 128 A. L. R.
73: "Although the jurisdiction of the courts of the domicil of one of
the parties to render a decree of annulment of a marriage celebrated
elsewhere is generally recognized... the courts are practically unani-
mous in holding that such jurisdiction may not be exercised under a
constructive service of process upon the non-resident defendant by
publication or personally without the state... "
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ed, that a voidable marriage continues valid to the date of the
annulment, even after that decree .... such practice seems whol-
ly justified.'
It is suggested above, however, that Sections 5729 and 5730
may provide for the annulment of some basically void marriages
as well as voidable ones. If so, is there an inconsistency therein
with the analysis just made of Section 5728? Actually, there
may be very good reason for requiring a formal adjudication of
some void marriages while not for others." However, these Sec-
tions must first be examined to determine if possible, what void
marriages, if any, come under them.
V. STATUS OF THE MARRIAGES SUBJECT TO
ANNULMENT UNDER R. C. M. 1935,
SECTIONS 5729-30
An examination of the six statutory causes for an annul-
ment suggests that they may very properly be grouped into three
distinct classes for analysis. Of these six causes, the Code ex-
pressly declares only three of them to be voidable-physical in-
capacity, fraud, and force. It also provides that a bigamous
marriage, entered into with the belief that the prior spouse was
dead, or if such spouse had been continuously absent five years,
"is valid until its nullity is adjudged by a competent tribunal."
This leaves "nonage," "unsound mind," and a "deliberately
bigamous marriage" to account for. Thus it appears that the
three classes mentioned, enumerated in their descending order
of "validity," are: 1. Nonage; 2. Bigamous marriages entered
into in good faith; and the statutorily described "voidable"
marriages; 3. Deliberately consummated bigamous marriages,
and marriages between persons either of whom is of "unsound
mind." They will be examined in the order given.
A. Marriages Annullable for Nonage
Section 5729 states:
"A marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes existing at the time of the marriage: 1. That the
party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage an-
nulled was under the age of legal consent, and such mar-
**Piper v. Piper (1907) 46 Wash. 671, 91 P. 189.
"In re Moncrief's Will (In re Gilbert) (1923) 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E.
550, assumes that an annulment in some cases at least is just a "for-
mal" way to establish a wholly void marriage: ". . . no longer might
husband and wife upon their own responsibility determine that they
were free from the contract. Such a determination required the con-
currence of the Court. .. "
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riage was contracted without the consent of his or her par-
ents or guardian,... unless, after attaining the age of con-
sent, such a party for any time freely cohabited with the
other as husband or wife... "
From this Section, it appears that nonage, standing alone, is not
sufficient to support an action for an annulment. Two things
must be alleged: 1. Nonage;.2. Lack of the consent of the adult
responsible for the nonaged male or female. Evidently, a mar-
riage attacked for nonage, not only is not void; it is not even
voidable, if parental consent was present. Such rule may be
predicated on either of two premises. Either nonage alone does
not even create a defect in the marriage, or, though such defect
exists, all interested parties are estopped to avail themselves of
it, if the parents consented. Even under the latter premise, de-
nying to the minor himself the -right to rescind, even if by es-
toppel is a basic change in the common law, and for all practical
purposes effects a validation of such marriages. However, a
recent Montana case, in denying an application of the mother'
of the boy who was seventeen, for an annulment of his marriage
with a woman twenty-one, because it found such consent pres-
ent, very properly put its decision on the frank ground that such
marriage was valid for all purposes. It says:
"The question then is: Does the consent of the par-
ent under the Idaho statute,' in order to make the marriage
valid, have to be written and acknowledged as provided in
"Cross v. Cross (1940) 110 Mont. 300, 102 P. (2d) 829. The Court notes
an apparent verbal inconsistency between §5712 providing that "no li-
cense shall be granted without the written consent of the father," and
§5729 which indicates that the annulment should be denied if consent
is had from "his or her parents or guardian, or person having charge
of him or her," but does not have to resolve the Sections by finding that
both parents had consented. However, the mother instituted the ac-
tion. It is doubtful that she had any such authority under §5730, even
though neither had consented, under its limitation that the action
should be brought by the nonaged person, or "by a parent, guardian,
or other person having charge of such non-aged. The father was
living.
'The case assumes that Idaho's and Montana's statutes were the same.
Ibid. at 303. On the general conflict of laws question of jurisdiction
to grant an annulment, see: Comment, Conflict of Law Governing
Annulment of Marriage, 1 MONT. L. REv. (Spring 1940) 56. Although
that comment recognizes the trend to establish an exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the matrimonial domicil to grant an annulment, it makes the
point that, "Even though Montana is allowed jurisdiction to annul a
marriage celebrated in Idaho, it would not seem to follow that Idaho,
the State by whose law the validity of the marriage is generally de-
termined, should be denied jurisdiction." 76 A. L. . 61, 62-3, is in
accord with the view that the jurisdiction should be concurrent,
though it is more concerned with discrediting the idea that exclusivejurisdiction should be at the place of celebration.
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section 31-202, supra, or is the marriage valid where the
parents had actually consented even though the consent was
not written?" "
The statement of the question of the case thus, assumed that an
appropriate consent validated the marriage, the Court conclud-
ing that a parol consent was sufficient. But this and similar
decisions from other states raise the question of whether, under
any circumstances today, a marriage may be defective for non-
age under the Montana Code. That is, under the law of mar-
riage, is there such thing as absolute incapacity to marry for
nonage? Although this study will not examine in detail the
question of when each of the causes for an annulment is deemed
to be established, the uncertainty under our Code of the effect
that age has on the capacity to marry almost compels some con-
sideration of that question.
The Montana Code says that,
"Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil
contract, to which the consent of parties capable of making
it is necessary .... "
It further provides, however, that,
"The provisions of other portions of this code in rela-
tion to contracts, and the capacity of persons to enter into
them, have no application to the contract of marriage.".
It then declares in Section 5696, that,
"Any unmarried male of the age of eighteen years or up-
wards, and any unmarried female of the age of sixteen years
or upwards, and not otherwise disqualified, is capable of
consenting to and consummating marriage."
The only age limitation on the issuing of marriage licenses, be-
cause of "minority" is Section 5712 which states that,
"Where either party is a minor, no license shall be
granted without the written consent of the father, if living;
if not, then of the mother. . . proved by the testimony of at
least one competent witness. "'
"Cross v. Cross (1940) 110 Mont. 300, 303, 102 P. (2d) 829, 830. Very
reasonably, the Court assumes that §5729 states the exclusive condi-
tions upon which an annulment may be granted for nonage. Likewise,
though other states have ruled that there are other than the statutory
grounds available for an annulment, it would seem not so under §5729,
because of its attempted comprehensiveness.
-R. C. M. 1935, §5695.
"R. C. M. 1935, §5708.
'R. C. M. 1935, §5696.
OQuestionnaires were sent to fifty-one of the fifty-six court clerks in the
State, to ascertain the general practice in issuing marriage licenses
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Inquiry of the court clerks the State over reveals the following
practice under these Sections: Without exception," no court
clerk will issue a license for a couple if the girl is less than six-
teen or the boy less than eighteen, no matter how urgently both
parents consent. If the girl is between sixteen and eighteen,
or the boy between eighteen and twenty-one, the conditions of
Section 5712 are applied strictly. This practice is based on the
theory that there is an utter lack of capacity to enter into the
marital state if either party has not attained the "age of legal
consent," under Section 5696-a not unreasonable construction
of that statute's language-and so Section 5712 necessarily is
limited to the period between those ages and general legal ma-
jority. As an original question, in view of Section 5708 declar-
ing that ordinary contract law and the capacity of persons to
enter therein do not apply to marriage law, it might persuasive-
ly be contended that the word "minor," in Section 5712 refers
to those less than sixteen and eighteen respectively-that these
are the ages of "majority" in marriage law. Indeed such inter-
pretation would be more consistent with the actual law"0 regulat-
ing the capacity of minors to marry, and with the interpreta-
tion given Section 5729, that if the parents have consented, a
marriage cannot be annulled, though one of the parties is less
as to age requirements. The court clerks responded readily to the
following two questions, forty-nine answering: 1. Will you issue a
license for a girl under 16 or a boy under 18, either with or without
the consent of the proper parent or guardian? If so, below what ages
do you refuse absolutely to issue a license? 2. Do you require that a
girl between the ages of 16 and 18, and a boy between 18 and 21 have
the consent of the proper parent or guardian? The first question in-
tended to reveal whether some clerks assumed that persons below the
"age of consent" had any capacity at all to marry. The second was
directed to the question of what meaning generally was given to the
word "minor" in §5712. But every reply considered the law to be so
clear and positive, that they thought the inquiry must be trying to
find out how generally the law was being breached. Space permitting,
many of the comments would be well worth repeating.
"One clerk stated that they never issued a license to one under the age
of consent "unless ordered by our county attorney," without explain-
ing what might bring forth such order. Another stated that in a few
cases where the parties were only a few months short of the statutory
age, the girl was with child, and the parents most urgent, licenses had
been issued under the statutory age. All others were adamant in in-
sisting that the "law" was literally complied with.7"Beggs v. State (1876) 55 Ala. 108; State ex rel. Scott v. Lowell (1899)
78 Minn. 166, 80 N. W. 877; Willits v. Willits (1906) 76 Neb. 228, 107
N. W. 379; Hunt v. Hunt (1909) 23 Okla. 490, 100 P 541 (even though
it was a criminal act to so marry) ; State v. Parker (1890) 106 N. C.
711, 11 S. E. 517 (although statute declared marriage void) ; 35 Am.
Jua., Marriage, §103; 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1202 and L. R. A. 1916C 740. 1
BisHop, op. cit. supra, note 2 §145, strongly approves the interpretation
that such statute does not make marriage below statutory age void,
but only moves up the common law age of consent.
21
Briggs: The Status of an Annulled Marriage in Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1943
THE STATUS OF AN ANNULLED MARRIAGE 35
than the "age of legal consent." However, it seems to be well
established that "minor"" is used in its ordinary sense in this
Section.
As just suggested, the view" that persons less than sixteen
and eighteen, respectively, completely lack capacity to marry is
discredited by the actual decisions interpreting Codes such as
Montana's. After reciting the now uniformly adopted rule"
that failure to follow the statutes regulating the issuance of the
license affects in no manner the validity or invalidity of the
marriage, a leading California case rules that, even though the
parents never consent, and although one or both parties are less
than eighteen and twenty-one respectively, if they have reached
the "age of legal consent," the marriage is unimpeachable for
any purpose.y' Another California case states positively that
"R. C. M. 1935, §5712 was taken from the CALIFORNIA Crvm CODE, which
said in so many words that if either party was under eighteen or
twenty-one respectively, parental consent was necessary. Apparently,
when Montana adopted the Section, the age limitation was expressed in
terms of "minority." CAL. CIv. CODE (Kerr 1908) §69.
"The proposition that one below the statutory age of consent Is utterly
incapable of marrying apparently is based on a series of attorney gen-
erals' opinions. All of these opinions rely heavily on the supposition
that marriage is essentially a contract and that §5696 states an abso-
lutely minimum capacity age. Relying on §8060 (R. C. M. 1935,
§10703), to the effect that there is no common law where the law Is
declared by the Code, one opinion concludes that §5696 excludes all
the common law as to capacity, although it admits that marriage under
the common law age of consent was not wholly void, and that some
states have continued that rule along with a statutory age of consent:
5 Atty. Gen. Op. Mont. (1912-14) 499. One cites a few cases from other
states which seem to be not pertinent: 3 Atty. Gen. Op. Mont. (1908-
10) 279, 280. See also 10 Atty. Gen. Op. Mont. (1922-24) 195. One as-
serts the now recognized rule that a marriage by persons between the
"age of consent" and majority are not even annullable, even though
the parents do not consent, but does not pass on the effect of parental
consent below the age of consent: 12 Atty. Gen. Op. Mont. (1926-28)
177. Though incomplete, this opinion points in the right direction.
None of them considers the significance of §5729 permitting an an-
nulment of one below the statutory age of consent, only If the parents
have not consented, unless it be the last one. Only the last opinion
was given after the leading cases cited below refuting the view that
there is no capacity to marry at all below the age of consent.
"Johnson v. Alexander (1918) 39 Cal. App. 177, 178 P. 297; Browning v.
Browning (1913) 89 Kan. 98, 130 P. 852; Cross v. Cross (1940) 110
Mont. 300, 102 P(2d) 829; Lessert v. Lessert (1935) 64 S. D. 3, 263
N. W. 559; 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAmIY LAWS 188; 16 Cal. Jur.
937; see 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1206, L. R. A. 1916C 741.
"4Johnson v. Alexander (1918) 39 Cal. App. 177, 178 P. 297. Cases like
this one, limiting the phrase "age of consent" in the annulment statute
to the statutory age of consent, so as to make unimpeachable the mar-
riage of a minor, though over the age of consent, necessarily imply
that if the parent consents to the marriage of his child less than the
age of consent, the marriage likewise Is not annullable. This case
so assumes. See L. R. A. 1916C 741: "And, of course, where the
statutes provide for the consent of a parent or guardian to the mar-
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though one of the parties is below the age of consent, the mar-
riage is valid if the parents consented.' The Montana case, ruling
that though one of the parties has not even attained the "age of
legal consent," it is a perfectly valid and trnannullable mar-
riage, has been discussed already." A recent South Dakota case
likewise rules that the statutory requirements as to consent of
parents to the issuance of a marriage license where parties are
minors is only directory and does not affect the validity of the
marriage. It also holds that, where the female was seventeen
and the male twenty, a judgment of the lower court annulling
the marriage was void though not appealed from in the time
limited, and so can be attacked collaterally, because the marriage
cannot be annulled for minority.' The statutes of these three
states are based on the Field Code and are almost identical, the
principal variation being in the age of legal consent for the fe-
male.
riage of a minor, and authorize the annulment of a marriage of the
person under the age of consent if celebrated without the consent of
the parent or guardian, the marriage of an infant under the age of
consent, but with the consent of the parent, is valid .... "
'People v. Souleotes (1915) 26 Cal. App. 309, 146 P. 903 (a state court
clerk cited this case as authority for the present local practice in re-
fusing to issue at all below the age of legal consent) ; see Matter of
the Guardianship of Ambrose (1915) 170 Cal. 160, 149 P. 43; Johnson
v. Alexander (1918) 39 Cal. App. 177, 178 P. 297. By amendment in
1921, the California Code provides that parties below the statutory
age of consent may marry, upon obtaining the Court's consent. CAL
Civ. CoDE (Deering 1937) §56. 16 CAL Jur. §30 makes the point that
it still does not follow that such marriage without judicial consent
would be annullable even, if parental consent given.
"Cross v. Cross (1940) 110 Mont. 300, 102 P(2d) 289. Cf. 1 VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 116-117. The schedule there given of the
"minimum marriageable age" for each state is merely a recital of stat-
utory provisions, or of the common law, and does not purport to re-
flect judicial construction. On pages 187-8, apparently Vernier gives
effect to the complete law as pronounced by the decisions herein con-
sidered.
17Lessert v. Lessert (1935) 64 S. D. 3, 263 N. W. 559. This present ap-
peal is from an order denying the appellant's motion that an annul-
ment decree, handed down almost two years earlier, annulling the
marriage between the appellant and the plaintiff's minor son, be
vacated. Adopting the appellant's theory of the case, this Court re-
verses the lower court's order, declaring that, since the invalidity of
the judgment was apparent on its face (because, though both the ap-
pellant and her husband were minors and didn't have parental consent,
they were above the "age of consent") "the judgment of annulment
was not merely erroneous, but absolutely void as it was beyond the
power and authority of the Court which rendered it." Ibid. at 361.
This is a very interesting decision as to what will be deemed "judg-
ment void on its face." In Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Lunning
(1936) 64 S. D. 168, 265 N. W. 876, 879, the Court had to limit the
decision in this respect, saying that it was the very special character
of the jurisdiction over annulment given the lower court by statute,
that made the judgment void.
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Many decisions from other states, under somewhat different
statutory provisions support the rule that a marriage under the
statutory age of consent is not void, as has generally been as-
sumed by those administering the law in Montana. Typical of
the position of these cases is that expressed by a leading Ala-
bama decision to the effect that:
"T'he statute (putting the age of legal consent at seven-
teen for male and fourteen for female) serves the purpose
of its enactment, when construed as operating merely an en-
largement of the age of consent, from that fixed by the com-
mon law-of twelve in females and fourteen in males-to
fourteen in females and seventeen in males. The marriage
between persons not of the statutory age is, as was the mar-
riage between persons not of the age of consent at com-
mon law, imperfect, becoming perfect only by affirmance
when the requisite age is obtained.' Until disaffirmance, it
is a marriage in fact, and the second marriage of either
party is bigamy... '
These cases, also support the conclusion that, in Montana, though
one or both of the parties may not have attained the age of six-
teen or eighteen respectively, they may have the right to demand
that a license be issued them-provided their parents consent. Of
course, if such marriages are not wholly valid and so are void-
able, the license issuing offices might be justified in refusing to
issue licenses, even though the reason for which they now refuse
to do so-supposed voidness-be wrong. But, the statutes under
which the last mentioned cases were decided, did not contain a
provision that a marriage might be annulled for nonage, only
provided the parents had not consented. Had they included
that provision, inevitably these cases would have held that such
"Since quite generally by statute, one may secure an annulment at any
time for nonage, there is some division of authority, whether at com-
mon law, one below the age of consent, could finally avoid the mar-
riage by his own act before he attained that age, or could disaffirm
only after attaining the legal age. No doubt, the uncertainty is pred-
icated largely on a doubt as to what extent the ordinary law govern-
ing a minor's ability to repudiate his contracts generally, controls the
present question. Common law authorities generally agree, however,
that final affirmance (and apparently disaffirmance) is permitted
only upon attaining the age of consent. 1 Co. LrIr. op. cit. smpra note
20, 123; 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 436; 1 BIsHOP, op. Cit. supra
note 2, 127; KENT'S COMMENTARIES, *78. But see 1 BisHop, 1o. cit.
supra, at n. 4, citing authorities contra.
79Beggs v. State (1876) 55 Ala. 108; 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1203; "... stat-
utes fixing the ages . . .or which, prohibit the celebration of a mar-
riage where the parties are under the prescribed ages, do not have the
effect of making a marriage contracted without the statutory requi-
sites void, but merely voidable; unless avoided, the relation remains
valid ....9; 35 AM. JuRa., MAR. §103; BIsHop, op. cit. &upra note 2, §145.
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marriage below the statutory age of consent would be unim-
peachable, down to at least the common law age of consent,
twelve and fourteen years, respectively.
These decisions again compel the posing of this question:
Are there no ages under the Montana Codes below which a child
is altogether incapable of marrying? These statutes themselves,
as thus interpreted indicate a negative answer. However, the
courts reasonably have assumed that the common law age limits
continue to govern. Those decisions just discussed, declaring
that marriages below the statutory age of consent are only void-
able, necessarily are based on the assumption that the common
law still operates in those jurisdictions. Moreover, even with-
out the aid of an annulment statute limiting the right to annul-
ment for nonage, as does ours, some courts have held such mar-
riages unimpeachable if the common law ages are satisfied.
Under a statute declaring that, "Marriage . .. may be entered
into by males of the age of 21, and females of the age of 18
years, who are otherwise capable", Washington has declared that
a marriage down to the ages of twelve and fourteen is valid for
all purposes.' Iowa has a similar rule.'
So, it appears that the right to marry in Montana, as limited
by the ages of the parties under the combined operation of the
common law and the Code, may be summarized as follows: If
either party is less than seven years of age, the marriage is ut-
terly null and void; if either party is over seven but less than
twelve, it will be voidable by either party,' either upon his at-
taining the common law age of consent, whether with or without
parental consent originally, or at any time until he reaches that
age ;' if either party is over the common law age of consent, but
under the statutory age of consent, whether the marriage is an-
nullable depends on whether the parents consented to the mar-
riage.' If both parties are over the age of legal consent, their
"'Cushman v. Cushman (1914) 80 Wash. 615, 142 P. 26.
'Goodwin v. Thompson (1849) 2 G. Greene 329.
61 Co. LIrTT., op. cit. 8upra note 20, 124; 1 BisHoP, op. cit. supra note A§149; 1 BLKSTN. COM. op. cit. supra note 5, 436; 2 KENT'S COM., *78.
"See note 78, 8upra.
"It is not altogether clear whether it makes any difference whether
such consent is given before or after the marriage. West v. West(1923) 62 Cal. App. 541, 217 P. 567, 568; ibid. (1924) 68 Cal. App. 258,
228 P. 1115, says that subsequent consent is not enough, apparently oper-
ating on the premise that there is no capacity to marry without such
consent. We know that is not true. Cross v. Cross (1940) 110 Mont.
300, 102 P(2d) 829 may hold contra. It seems to make little differ-
ence to the Court in that case whether the consent came before or
after the ceremony. The latter seems to be the preferable rule, and
can be supported both on "principle" and on policy. If such marriages
of minors are only imperfect and not utterly void, as seems now clear-
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marriage is unimpeachable even though the parents have not
given their consent, and a license was issued in violation of Sec-
tion 5712. So, if both parties are over the age of consent, though
yet minors, the marriage is not annullable at all. If the parents
consent, it is not annullable down to the ages of twelve and
fourteen, respectively. Below that age, the interaction of the
common law with the Code is not clear. If the former operates
unmodified, either party may avoid, without court action, even,
when the one below the common law age of consent attains that
age. If the Code's literal language, that marriage for nonage
may be annulled if the parent has not consented, is held to state
an exclusive condition for avoiding, then no purported marriage
could ever be avoided for nonage alone, where such consent ex-
isted. Very probably, however, the Supreme Court would avoid
such extreme result by imposing on the Code, the limitations of
the common law, below the age of seven.'
ly established, the defect of lack of original parental consent, should
be curable. Further, under a statute like Montana's, making the right
to petition for an annulment dependent on such consent, giving such
consent may well work as a form of estoppel. A grudging apparent
acquiescence in what appears to be the best of a bad bargain, how-
ever, need not be treated as the consent required by the statute, if it
seems unjust for it to operate as an estoppel.
8Probably it would be well to interpret §5729 as simply extending the
common law period for an inchoate marriage so that it would be from
seven to sixteen-eighteen, rather than seven to twelve-fourteen as for-
merly, with the other limitations of the statute imposed on that entire
period. This would concur with the oft approved view that statutorily
stated ages of consent "operate merely as an enlargement of the com-
mon law age of consent." Thus applied, a child would be able to avoid
at any time before he reaches either age of consent if the parent did
not consent, regardless of what was the common law on this subject.
Also he will not be able to avoid by his own act at any age-only afterjudicial decree. This should be a salutary rule. However, any child
above seven, could enter into a binding marriage with parental consent.
Though, no doubt, this would be extremely objectionable to many, its
occurrence would be so rare that it is not so serious a practical objec-
tion. An alternative would be to say that §5729 applies to ages below
twelve and fourteen for some purposes, but not for others. of. VKa-
NIER, AMEICAN FAMILY LAws 117 n. 8. He suggests that, since the
amendment of 1921, (8upra note 75) saying that any person under the
ages of sixteen and eighteen respectively may, under certain circum-
stances, marry, ". . . It could thus be argued with some force that
California has abrogated even the common-law age of consent." There
is no logical reason why, if the statutory provisions be extended down
to seven years, they should not be deemed to cover ages below seven
as well, making marriage at any age possible, but there is the very
sensible one of "reasonable construction," creating an extremely strong
presumption that the Legislature did not intend to so change the law
as to give even a qualified approval of any kind of a purported mar-
riage below those ages. To the objection that the same may be said
as to legislative intent to permit marriages below the statutory age of
consent, the answer is that a considerable part of the common law al-
ready is definitely established as continuing to govern, by judicial
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V. B, OTHER VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Reasons for concluding that the Field Code eliminates the
retroactive operation of an annulment of a marriage that the
Code makes "voidable" only, already have been stated briefly.
Unless the few changes occurring in the Montana Code have re-
jected that principle, it must produce the same result. It is
submitted that the second group of causes giving a right to an-
nulment-fraud, force and physical incapacity at the time of the
marriage (apparently if incurable)--having been expressly
made both "voidable" and "annullable" by statute, do not af-
fect the validity of the marriage for any purpose, such marriages
being terminated or dissolved, rather than made "void ab in-
itio. '  But to justify fully this conclusion it will be necessary
to examine further, the phrase "void from the time its nullity
is adjudged by a competent tribunal." Though not appearing
in Code Section 5698 stipulating voidable marriages, almost the
same clause is found in Section 5705, providing that in certain
cases a bigamous marriage "is valid until its nullity is adjudged
by a competent tribunal." Moreover, the proper meaning of the
clause in the Field Code should help to determine the sense in
which is used the word "voidable" in Section 5698.
It is submitted that the phrase "void from the time its nul-
lity is adjudged by a competent tribunal" has only one natural
meaning. Surely, to say that that phrase intends to declare that
such marriage is void ab initio, impresses one in much the same
way as to say that white is the same as black. They convey an
antithesis of meaning. It seems that such was the understand-
ing of the framers of the Field Code. Had they wanted to de-
clare that an annulled marriage was void ab initio, they almost
certainly would have said that it was "voidable," because the
latter's meaning in domestic relations was well established at
the drafting of the Code. "Void ab initio" was just what they
did not want to say, because they wished to eliminate the retro-
active character of an annulment. "Ab initio" was the culprit;
so they substituted for it a phrase which appeared to mean the
construction-and not unreasonably. The question of just how much
remains with us. There seems to be a lacuna in the law here, as the
courts interpret the statutes. They should consider it both their func-
tion and duty to engage in a process of "judicial legislating" in terms
of what the legislature would be presumed to have intended had they
thought through the entire question. See 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAM-
Ly Lws 118.
"This study does not consider the question of when there will be
deemed present the fraud, the force, etc.,, necessary to meet the Code
requirements for an annulment. These questions are extensively an-
notated In the various series of selected annotations available.
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very negation of relating back. They retained the word "void"
because they were in the annulment field, which always talked in
terms of "being void" rather than of a "dissolution." Its re-
tention recogfnized the distinguishing character between "annul-
ment" and "divorce," in that the former was granted for a
cause existing at the time of the marriage; the latter for a cause
arising thereafter.
The above interpretation seems to be consistent, not only
with the "natural" meaning of our clause. It agrees with the
usage of lawyers, who invariably use precisely the phrase herein
involved or one identical in meaning when they want to say
that an annulment in some states has no retroactive effect. To
point out that different jurisdictions give different consequen-
ces to marriages annulled for the same reasons, Vernier says
that, "In some, the decree may operate to make the relationship
an absolute nullity from the beginning; in others, it may be
void only from the date of the decree.'' The Restatement of
the Conflict of Laws, the product of a large number of legal
minds, tells us that,
"Proceedings to nullify a marriage from the date of the
decree are provided by statute in some states. T1his proceed-
ing differs from that described in Comment a in that it de-
stroys the marriage, not from its inception, but only from
the date of the decree.' It differs from divorce in that the
cause existed at the time of the marriage instead of arising
after it. The effect of such a decree upon the marriage is
the same as that of a decree of divorce. "'
To justify the conclusion that the offspring of a marriage, void-
able for duress, was legitimate even after annulment, a recent
Louisiana case declares,
"The consequence of these provisions of the Code is
that a marriage celebrated according to the forms of law,
even though the consent of one of the parties was compelled
by violence and by putting him or her in fear, must be re-
'I VEaNiza, AMiEICAN FAMILY LAWS 238. This authority even uses
the word "voidable" as identical with a non-retroactive decree, as it
seems to be used in the Montana Code, though elsewhere, he carefully
points out its "common law" meaning: "The better view would seem
to be that, even though such marriages are absolutely prohibited, they
should not be held utterly void ab initio, but should be voidable merely
in a proper proceeding. To hold otherwise is to add the stigma of
bastardy to children who already unknowingly bear the burden of po-
tential insanity . . ." (italics supplied). Ibid. 189.
8Italicg supplied.
'RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §115, Comnwnt c.
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 4 [1943], Iss. 1, Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol4/iss1/16
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
garded as a valid marriage until it is annulled by a judicial
decree rendered in a direct action of nullity.'"
Different legal writers conclude that the suggestion that the
clause "void from the time their nullity shall be declared by a
court" simply means void ab initio "invite(s) critical com-
ment. " ' In discussing the New York statute stating that a good
faith bigamous marriage shall be void only from the decree,
Bishop assumes that the language unequivocally makes the de-
cree non-retroactive:
". .. the sentence annulling this second marriage dif-
fers materially in effect from that annulling a marriage
voidable for a canonical defect; rendering it void only from
the time it is so pronounced, while the sentence for a canon-
ical defect makes it void from the beginning... "2
Though he is merciless in his criticism of legislation producing
the same effect on a marriage defective for insanity or duress,
it never occurs to him that the clause could have any other
meaning."
The word "null" or "a nullity" is a stronger expression if
anything, meaning "of no legal consequence", than "void."
Hence the above authors uniformly assume that a defective mar-
riage may be void or null, from the date of the decree, without
having any retroactive effect.
Although several states have statutes providing that cer-
tain defective marriages shall be "void from the time its nullity
is adjudged by a competent tribunal" only, there have been few
decisions clearly stating the effect of such statute on the law of
annulment, other than by the New York Courts. A Wisconsin
case is typical, both in the problem raised and in the treatment
given.9 ' The plaintiff husband sought an annulment on the
'In re Barth's Succession (1934) 178 La. 847, 152 So. 543, 91 A. L. R.
408, 410.
"Note (1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 109; Comment (1938) 10 Miss. L.
JRNL. 85.
21 BisHoP, op. cit. 8upra note 2, 95.
"Ibid. 71-75. Though Bishop goes to great length to demonstrate that
a marriage is much more than just a contract, he seems obsessed with
the idea that no person with capacity to contract in the ordinary sense
should be able to enter a binding marriage, though formally he puts
his objection to making marriages of insane persons and those operat-
ing under duress voidable only, in part, on the disastrous results aris-
ing therefrom, evidently having in mind only the most extreme cases
of each such person being taken advantage of by another. But from
policy there is nothing to indicate that it is any more a solution to
have all such marriages void from the first than it is to declare them
voidable by decree only.
"Stewart v. Vendervort (1890) 34 W. Va. 524, 12 S. E. 736, declares
that their statute, identical in substance with Montana's does not op-
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ground of infancy. The precise question raised was whether
voluntary cohabitation after marriage, but before plaintiff had
reached the statutory age of consent prevented him from seek-
ing an annulment. The statute making such marriage "void
from such time as shall be fixed by the judgment of a court of
competent authority declaring the nullity thereof," added a
proviso to the effect that "there shall have been no subsequent
cohabitation of the parties." To determine the effect of this
provision the Court thought it necessary to decide whether a
marriage, annullable for infancy, was wholly void. It stated the
rule of the case thus:
"This marriage is not an absolute nullity. It is only
annulled from such time as shall be fixed by the judgment
of the court. During the time intervening the marriage is
valid. It is, so to speak, a marriage on condition subsequent,
the condition being its disaffirmance by a party thereto,
and annulment thereof by the court, from the time named.
If the plaintiff had capacity to become a party to such im-
perfect and inchoate or conditional marriage, he should have
capacity to disaffirm it any time thereafter, before it has
ripened into an absolute marriage.'
Though possibly not conclusive, this language smacks strongly of
the idea that an annulment has no retroactive effect." A later
Wisconsin case ruled that though the defendant's first marriage
was annullable, it was sufficient to support a prosecution for
bigamy upon his marrying the second time, without such for-
mal annulment." But this case is not conclusive, because other
courts have reached the same result, without the aid of a statute
as is here involved.-
On numerous occasions, however, the New York courts have
erate ab inWtio. The bigamous marriage before the Court had been
celebrated before the enactment of this statute, so the Court finds it
void, but concludes it would have been otherwise if celebrated after
the statute's passage.
"Eiot v. Eliot (1890) 77 Wisc. 634, 46 N. W. 806, 808.
"Though Wisconsin's statutes are cited along with New York's, W. Vir-
ginia's, there is a subtle, though profound difference between Wiscon-
sin's statute and New York's, W. Virginia's, Minnesota's, Virginia's
and similar statutes. The latters' statutes state explicitly that the
marriage shall be void from the decree. Wisconsin's, however, states
that it shall be void "from such time as shall be fixed by the judg-
ment of the Court." Of course, this leaves even less room to say
that It is retroactive. Clearly it is not so automatically. The Eliot
case recognizes that the Court may 8elect the date for its voidness.
This may be an effective way to avoid the objections sometimes found
in an invariable rule either of original voidness, or of voidness only
from the decree.
'State v. Cone (1893) 86 Wisc. 498, 57 N. W. 50.
'Beggs v. State (1876) 55 Ala. 108.
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interpreted their statute. Almost without exceptione the inter-
mediate appellate courts have declared that an annulment under
a code section identical in substance with the Field Code, has no
retroactive effect on the marital status. This has been put most
cogently, perhaps by Houle v. Houle, in the following words:
"... the statute has modified the common law rule un-
der which a voidable marriage, when annulled, became void
ab initio ... I have therefore no doubt that the child of the
parties to this action, born out of lawful wedlock, became
legitimated by their marriage and its status in that regard
could not be disturbed because of the subsequent annulment
of the marriage .... "'
It was stated above that the clause, "void from the time, etc.,"
naturally conveys the idea of non-retroactivity, both to legal
publicists and to courts. These intermediate court decisions from
New York fully support that statement. Barker v. Barker suc-
cinctly puts it thus:
"Nor could such judgment of annulment operate to dis-
solve the first marriage ab initio .... The judgment could
not be broader than the statute authorizing it, which de-
clares such marriage void only from the* time it is an-
nulled. "'
The Court assumes this to be a self-evident precept from the
clear wording of the statute. Hence, it is rather surprising to
find the New York Court of Appeals explicitly taking a con-
trary view. In In re Moncrief's Will,' that Court rules that a
child born out of wedlock, though presumably legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of its parents, becomes illegitimate again
upon the annulment of such marriage on the ground of duress,
basing this conclusion upon its finding that the phrase "void
from the time, etc. . . " is simply a reiteration of the common
"People v. Heinle (1921) 188 N. Y. S. 399, is one of the few cases from
an intermediate court suggesting a contrary interpretation: "... If
the wife succeeds in her action, the decree of nullity in effect dates
back to the date of their marriage. . ." id. 400.
"'Houle v. Houle (1917) 166 N. Y. S. 67, 68-9.
'"Barker v. Barker (1916) 158 N. Y. S. 413, 417.
"'In re Moncrief's Will (1923) 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550. The present
action involves a contest in heirship rather than annulment. The
Court states the facts and legal question thus: "If Agnes A. Ga Nun
was legitimate, as she has been held to be by the courts below, her
child is entitled to a distributive share in the estate of Jane Moncrief.
Agnes A. Ga Nun was born on February 5, 1882. On the next day
her parents were married. On June 23, 1883, this marriage was an-
nulled for duress and force on the complaint of the husband .. "
Under the present New York statutes the Court would have legitimat-
ed the offspring when it voided the marriage. N. Y. C. P. A. §1135.
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law rule that a voidable marriage is void ab initio upon annul-
ment. However, several special considerations in the case limit
its significance as general authority. It relies heavily on other
statutory provisions which it thinks impel the decision. The par-
ticular grounds for the original annulment--duress-is a condi-
tioning factor. It considers a marriage as essentially a contract.
A contract without consent is inconceivable in the law. Hence
basically, it must be void at the outset, if no consent."' It then
finds that though it once was seriously thought in New York,
that such marriage was absolutely void, the Legislature provided
that its voidness should be determined by judicial pronounce-
ment, but insists that such provision did not change its basic
character as a void contract.' It cannot bring itself to think of
the word "void" being applied to any kind of a marriage that
is not void from the outset, once its voidness is determined, and
feels partly supported by the statutory provision that a marriage
is a civil contract depending on free consent. It also finds that
by statute some marriages declared void from the decree may be
attacked even after the injured party has died. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, it cites the fact that, from time to
time, the legislature has found it expedient to declare legitimate
the offspring of first one annulled marriage and then another,
and concludes that, if annulled marriages did not relate back,
such explicit provision for their legitimacy would be unneces-
sary."U So, not only should this case not be deemed controlling
in interpreting Montana law; it should not be considered per-
suasive even, for the proposition that an annulment relates back
to make the marriage void from the first, under R. C. M. Sec-
tions 5729-30. Indeed, we shall see shortly, that in one im-
portant respect, it is very persuasive authority that such annul-
ments are not retroactive under our Code.'
Having decided both the natural and legal meanings of the
phrase, "void from the time its nullity is adjudged by a com-
petent tribunal," there remains the question of the Legislature's
purpose in substituting for that phrase the term "voidable."
That term seems to have replaced Field's clause, either as a
'In re Moncrief's Will, supra, 139 N. E. 550, 551.1°'ibM.
1"Ibid 139 N. E. 550, 552.
'1For authority suggesting that even New York may limit the doctrine
of relating back, see Sleicher v. Sleicher (1929) 251 N. Y. 366, 167
N. E. 501. In a case note (1929) 39 YALE L. JuNL. 133, the writer ob-
serves, in referring to this case: ". . . the broader doctrine, here ap-
plied for the first time to the annulment of a marriage, that the re-
lating back or rescission ab initio 'is . . . without limits prescribed
by policy and justice,' has advantage beyond the result of the instant
case ...... Cf. note (1929) 43 HAav. L. REv. 109, 111.
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synonym, or to change the law established by that clause. If, as
has been shown, the meaning naturally given the latter is that
an annulment does not relate back, it is extremely probable that
such was the construction of the codifiers making the substitu-
tion. Having accepted this meaning, it seems extremely unlike-
ly that the framers of our present Code would take such a "re-
actionary" step as to reimpose deliberately the common law dis-
tinction between "'void" and "voidable" marriages on our Code,
in view of its now thoroughly discredited origins. Particularly
is this true since the other statutory provisions indicating that
an annulment is not retroactive in operation, are retained in our
own Code. The word "voidable" in its ordinary contract sense
would be a perfect synonym. Though the special meaning of
"voidable" in domestic relations was well known by legal spe-
cialists, such as Field, it is far more often used in its non-retro-
active sense. Indeed, courts themselves, recently, have not hesi-
tated to give the word "voidable," as applied to a marriage this
non-retroactive meaning without the aid of a statute.1" But the
proposition that those marriages described as "voidable" under
our Code do not become void marriages after annulment is sup-
ported by much more than such idle speculations.
More significantly, this conclusion is supported by the fact
that the earlier Montana (Bannack) Code expressly declared
that the offspring of all marriages made annullable by statute
(statutory divorce for causes existing at the marriage) were le-
gitimate." Although only two such stated causes are included
in the enumerated causes for dissolving the marital relation, the
declaration of legitimacy, seems to support a general policy
which we know uniformly governed the early legislatures of the
Western states particularly, of giving all children the benefits
of legitimacy. It would indeed be presumptuous to assume that
the Montana Legislature chose to repudiate this salutary policy
and by Section 5731 discussed infra, to legitimate the offspring
of only a very small portion of purported marriages admitted
to be void under the Code. Moreover, of the six causes for which
an annulment may be given under R. C. M. 1935, Section 5729,
the following Section explicitly provides that only one of the
parties may secure an annulment, in four of those cases, and the
other two-bigamy and insanity-are universally wholly void,
aside from statute. Further, very short statutes of limitations,
in effect, are imposed on the one person having the right to
In re Barth's Succession (1934) 178 La. 847, 152 So. 543; Tyson v.
State (1922) 83 Fla. 7, 90 So. 622.
10BANNACK STATS. p. 430, §1.
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complain. Such provisions as these are the very antithesis of
the common law "voidable" marriage, representing a basic
though subtle modification therein. Characteristically, either
party had the right to object if he wished, because it was only
presumably valid, and so intrinsically just as void as any mar-
riage could be.I" The law is not in the habit of calling a trans-
action absolutely binding on one party, as "void" for any pur-
pose. Moreover, the proceeding is very similar to a divorce in
this respect.
However, the most conclusive evidence that a "voidable"
marriage does not become "void" by relation back in Montana
is found in the Code's treatment of the problem of "legitimacy."
R. C. M. 1935, Section 5731, very similar to the Field Code, ex-
pressly provides that the offspring both of a bigamous marriage
contracted in good faith by either party,' and of a marriage
annulled on the ground of insanity, are legitimate." It just as
explicitly fails to say anything about the offspring of any of
the other annullable marriages. If we assume that, for that rea-
son all the other offspring are bastards, we have the appalling
and ridiculous result that the children of two kinds of marriages
deemed uniformly absolutely void at the common law are le-
gitimate, but that children of marriages for the most part not
l"This is not to say that the right to avoid may not have been limited
to the injured party by the modern common law as to some causes,
on grounds of estoppel, at least. Though quite generally so limited by
statute, the uncertainty on this point, at common law, is indicated by
Bishop in discussing the effect of fraud, error and duress on a mar-
riage. Though insisting that such marriages are of no effect whatso-
ever, until the wronged person has confirmed with knowledge, he fur-
ther opines that, "We may presume that the party guilty of the wrong
would not be permitted to take advantage of it, by maintaining a suit
of nullity solely on that ground." BISHOP, op. cit. 8upra note 2, 180.
He cites no direct authority. Even though such be the modern com-
mon law, it is inconsistent with the basic doctrine as to the character
of a voidable marriage. Witness the early law's insistence that if the
nonaged party can avoid, the other must necessarily have the same
power. The fact that limiting the right to the injured party, as to these
causes, is a common practice today, demonstrates the anachronistic
character of the survival of the doctrine of relation back.
n"Interestingly, by the actual language of §5731, the children of a big-
amous marriage are legitimate if either parent acted in good faith;
while by the actual language of §5705, such marriage "is valid until
nullity is adjudged by a competent tribunal," only provided the per-
son committing the bigamy acts in good faith. Hence, if these sec-
tions are construed literally, the offspring of an originally void big-
amous marriage may be legitimate. Of course, their legitimacy like-
wise may be supported by §7074 declaring legitimate "... the issue of
all marriages null in law .. "
"'In contrast to §5731, §56 of the FELD COD, merely states a property
rule of inheritance; ". . . (such children) are entitled to succeed in
the same manner as legitimate children to the estate of the parent,
who, at the time of the marriage, was competent to contract."
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socially objectionable at all, and merely giving rise to a strictly
personal power in only one of the parents to terminate the mar-
riage, are bastardized. So, such treatment of the subject of le-
gitimacy in the Code chapters dealing with domestic relations,
compels the conclusion that the Code framers intended that the
incidents of legitimacy should attach to the offspring of the
marriages not named in Section 5731, even after annulment by
virtue of the inherent nature of the marriage relation itself.
And finally, the Montana Code retains the provision of the Field
Code that the custody of the children of a marriage annulled for
fraud or force, must be awarded to the innocent parent, and
that the guilty party may be required to maintain and edu-
cate.'" It also stipulates that the mother only, of an illegitimate
child shall be entitled to its custody."' So it seems that the chil-
dren of those marriages, by necessary inference are deemed le-
gitimate, because their parents' marriages are dissolved, rather
than voided. And the mere fact that in a remote Section of the
Code, in a part dealing with ownership of property, we unex-
pectedly find a clause declaring that, "The issue of all mar-
riages null in law, or dissolved by divorce are legitimate,'"
does not militate against this view. In the first place, that pro-
vision was not found in the Field Code, while all of the others
above mentioned were. Further, it is only reasonable to expect
to find the full question of legitimacy dealt with in the chapters
on domestic relations. Finally, the sentence just quoted appears
to be a simple recital of a legal incident already established by
other appropriate portions of the Code.
Interestingly, although the two principal New York cases
above discussed reached opposite results as to the status of an-
nulled marriages in New York, they join in strongly supporting
the construction just above given to our statutes. Looking to
its own statutes, Houle v. Houle found (though apparently er-
roneously) that, though the offspring of some bigamous mar-
riages were legitimated, nothing was said about the children of
other annullable marriages.' It concludes:
"The Code, however, contains no provision upon the
subject of legitimating children born or begotten under
voidable marriage. This would seem to be entirely logical,
for the all-sufficient reason that the statute has modified
the common-law rule under which a voidable marriage,
when annulled, became void ab initio . . . by providing that
"R. C. M. 1935, §5732.
"'R. C. M. 1935, §5837.
14R. C. M. 1935, §7074.
u5(1917) 100 Misc. Rep. 28, 166 N. Y. S. 67.
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it is only void from the time that its nullity is judicially
declared .... I have therefore no doubt that the child of the
parties to this action, born out of lawful wedlock, became
legitimated by their marriage... and its status in that re-
gard could not be disturbed because of the subsequent an-
nulment of the marriage."'
Although In re Moncrief's Will differed from the Houle case
as to what provision their statutes made for legitimating such
offspring, it used exactly the same line of reasoning as we have
been pursuing. It found that the New York Legislature had
considered it necessary expressly to legitimate the offspring of
marriages annulled either for nonage, or for idiocy or lunacy,
concluding with, "All this would have been unnecessary, were
the children legitimate in any event .. ...
V. C, VOID MARRIAGES SUBJECT TO ANNULMENT
The third and remaining group of causes for annulment,
that either party had a living spouse at the second marriage, or
that either one was of "unsound mind," may be thought an an-
omaly in the field of annulment. This group is distinctive in
that, although provision is made for their annulment, they may
be utterly null and void. That this is definitely true of some
bigamous marriages, and almost as definitely not true, of others
under R. C. M. 1935, Section 5705, seems generally agreed."' If
the extra spouse has been absent and not known to be living for
the space of five successive years immediately preceding the
present marriage, or was generally reputed and believed by the
surviving spouse to be dead, the second marriage is valid until
its annulment, i.e., the annulment does not relate back; other-
wise it is illegal and void from the beginning.11'
...lbi4., 166 N. Y. S. at 69.
'(1923) 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550, 552.
" In re Gregorson's Estate (1911) 160 Cal. 21, 116 P. 60, 62; CAL.
Jup §28. See note 54 supra.
.'As noted supra, note 52, recent California cases are using §5728 in-
stead of §5729, upon which to base an action of nullity of a bigamous
marriage, apparently to avoid the "unclean hands" doctrine: "Where
the marriage is only voidable, the plaintiff's misconduct or lack of
'clean hands' may be considered, but public policy favors the dec-
laration of nullity of a void marriage...." Anderson v. Anderson (1936)
7 Cal. App. (2d) 265, 60 P. (2d) 290, 291. Why such procedure
should be necessary is hard to explain. Both California's and Mon-
tana's Codes explicitly provide that either party or the former spouse
may petition to have annulled the bigamous marriage. Indeed, the
Codes expressly state what persons may annul for each cause-some-
times the wrongdoer; sometimes the innocent person only. CAL. CIV.
CODS §§82, 83; R. C. M. 1935, §§5729-30. There seems to be little
room left for the equitable doctrine of clean hands, even considering
the proceeding as equitable in nature. Moreover, once it is clearly
realized that the annulment sections cover both voidable and void
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Perhaps the problem of determining the status of a mar-
riage annullable for unsoundness of mind, is the most interest-
ing-and peculiar-of the lot. It would seem that the Code
framers, at different times, have used every verbal device avail-
able to obscure the answer. The Montana Code refers in at
least three principal places to the effect that a mental aberra-
tion of a person has upon the marriage of that person. In no
two places is the same word used to describe the mental condi-
tion involved. Section 5699 declares that a marriage between
persons, either of whom is feeble-minded is "incestuous7 and
void from the beginning"; Section 5729 permits an annulment if
either party was of "unsound mind," and Section 5731 declares
that the children of a marriage, annulled on the ground of "in-
sanity," shall be legitimate. Section 5676 defines "persons of
unsound mind" as "idiots, lunatics, imbeciles, and habitual
drunkards."" The words "feeble-minded" and "insanity"
are not statutorily defined. The use of this variety of terms, ad-
mittedly containing varying shades of meaning generally, poses
the question of whether the Legislature intended to use them
synonymously. Though not offering a direct answer, the pro-
visions of the Field Code on this topic, shed some light on the
sources of the present problem.
T'hat Code"' contains all of the provisions above referred to
in the present Montana Code, except the one declaring that the
marriage of a "feeble-minded" person is "incestuous and void
from the beginning." Instead, it expressly provides that the
marriage of a person "incapable of consent for want of ... un-
derstanding" . . . is void from the time its nullity is adjudged
marriages, it should become apparent that it should be a matter of in-
difference for this purpose, whether suit be based on the "declarato-
ry" section, or the "annulment" sections, In any event.
See Hahn v. Hahn (1918) 104 Wash. 227, 176 P. 3.
"'The patchwork character of this Section is revealed by the fact that
it declares that a marriage by a "feeble-minded" person is "incestu-
ous." That is because the Section, from the FIELD CoDE down to this
amendment, dealt only with incestuous marriages. The feeble-minded
provision was thrown in without otherwise modifying the Section.
"'The word "idiot" is defined In R. C. M. 1935, §1420 thus: "Idiotic
persons are considered as insane persons." This presumably was to
qualify them for admission to the insane asylum.
'-'FIELD CODE, §§54, 56, 13.
"'fI. Shafe v. Shafe (1935) 101 Ind. App. 200, 198 N. E. 826. (Con-
strued in 128 A. L. R. 61 at 74.) It interprets the same phrase in its
statute as not applying to an insane person. However, the Field Code
states the legal effect for everyone of the other causes for annulling
a marriage. It is not at all unlikely that it would fail to mention the
effect of an attempt to marry by an insane person. This is the only
phrase used suggesting mental defectiveness. It is submitted that Is
reason enough to conclude this Section covers cases of "unsound mind."
See infra note 126.
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by a competent tribunal."" Hence, it clearly intended that,
whatever may have been the common law, a marriage annulled
for contractual incapacity because of any form of mental inca-
pacity should be voidable only. The villain of the piece is in-
jected into the Montana Code by an amendment' to Section 5699
on void marriages, making marriages between first cousins and
between couples, either of whom is feeble-minded, absolutely
void, for the first time. This enactment disrupts the legislative
consistency evolved by the Field Code, in a most unfortunate
manner.' The "natural" meanings of the terms used do not
help resolve the difficulty.
A "feeble-minded person" ordinarily does not denote a
person with total lack of contractual capacity, but rather, in the
words of Webster, does it describe a person: "Weak in will or
understanding; having a mental infirmity; specif: a. Wanting
firmness or constancy; irresolute; vacillating. . . b. Having a
mind incapable of normal development, though of better intelli-
gence than imbeciles and idiots. . ""' An Iowa case nicely il-
lustrates the great variety of shades of meaning of different
terms descriptive of the mental condition.
"... 'imbecility of mind,' while hardly capable of ex-
act or comprehensive definition, is generally applied to a
lack of normal mentality not so complete or absolute as ex-
ists in the condition we call 'idiocy,' but greater and more
marked than in cases to which in ordinary parlance we ap-
ply the milder term, 'feeble-mindedness'. "'
On the other hand, as defined in the Code, "unsoundness of
mind" seems to be descriptive of the more extreme forms of
mental debility-idiocy, lunacy, imbecilic character.' Hence, if
it were the marriage of a person with unsound mind that were
"
4FtLD CODE, §39.
..Ch. 6, §1, LAWS OF MONT. 1919; R. C. M. 1935, §5699.
"'R. C. M. 1935, §5683 states that a person entirely without understand-
ing has no power whatever to make a contract. But §5684 declares
that contracts by persons with unsound minds, but not entirely with-
out understanding, are subject to rescission only. Though these Sec-
tions do not directly control marriage law under §5708, saying that
the law of contracts generally does not govern marriage contracts, it
appears that the meaning of various terms has been carried over.
§5684 strongly suggests that at least some forms of "unsound minds"
have some contractual capacity in the general sense. Incidentally, the
use of the phrase "without understanding" in §5683 (FtmD CODE, §20)
strongly supports the conclusion that the phrase "want of . .. under-
standing" in §39 of the Field Code refers to an unsound mind.
" WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE
'"State v. Haner (1919) 186 Iowa 1259, 173 N. W. 225. Similarly:
Gould v. Gould (1905) 78 Conn. 242, 61 A. 604, 612.
'See the discussion of §§5683-4, supra note 126.
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declared absolutely void, and the one with a feeble mind made
annullable only, the provisions would be quite understandable-
though one doubted the wisdom of making such distinction.
That would be consistent with the former being fatally defective
for want of contractual capacity ;' with the latter, though not
defective T' for that reason, raising a personal privilege in the
other party to the marriage to avoid if he wanted to, partic-
ularly if he did not know of the mental defect at the marriage.
In its present state, however, it is extremely difficult to discern
any reasonable policy motivating these Sections. Probably, the
most reasonable explanation is that the amendment to Section
5699 intended to use a generic term encompassing and making
all forms of mental abnormalities a fatal defect to a marriage,
the framers thereof just selecting an unhappy terminology to
express that purpose. This interpretation is supported by the
fact that the same amendment made absolutely void marriage
between first cousins, which suggests that it was seeking to dis-
courage certain marriages on purely genetical grounds. If such
was the purpose it should hardly be necessary to point out the
extremely objectionable features of this form of regulation. It
is doubtful indeed that making the marriage void will serve as
the least deterrent to the principals. How automatically de-
claring void the marriage of one with unsound mind, accom-
plished in fact, can possibly serve any interest whatsoever, is
hard to see, though there may be good reason to vest the court
with such power in individual cases.
If Section 5699 be interpreted as absolutely prohibiting the
marriage of only one very special type of mentally deficient
person not included in the term "unsound mind," marriages an-
nullable for other types of mental abnormalities will be voidable
only, and dissolved from the date of the decree-such seems to
be the over-all purpose of our annulment law. If, however, it
be interpreted as voiding all such marriages we have the inter-
esting phenomenon of a statutory provision for the annulment
"O'nough the very early common law apparently ruled that the off-
spring of an idiot was legitimate, both COKm and BLACKSTONE severely
condemn such rule, apparently unable to conceive of the law (being
able to?) making a person without legally recognized volition, one
party to the marital relation. 1 Co. LiTT. OP. Cit. 8upra note 20 p. 125,
n. 3; 1 BLACKSTONE'S COM. 438-9.
'Fleming v. Consolidated Motor Sales Co. (1925) 74 Mont. 245, 240 P.
376, 382: No degree of mental weakness short of entire lack of under-
standing will vitiate a contract, in the absence of fraud or imposition.
State v. Simes (1906) 12 Idaho 310, 85 P. 914: A feeble-minded person
may be a witness.
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of an absolutely void marriage.' Although no such practice
prevailed at the common law, the annulment decree being asso-
ciated exclusively with the "voidable" marriage only, a func-
tional use of the annulment proceeding may more than justify
extending it to some forms of void marriages, at least. Au-
thority frequently supports the proposition that though a mar-
riage be absolutely void, and so no sentence of avoidance is nec-
essary, yet,
"as well for the good order of society as for the peace
of mind of all persons concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared
by a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."'
This being true as to void.marriages generally, it makes real
sense to make a formal annulment proceeding the exclusive
method for establishing the voidness of those marriages, where
the existence of the defect required for its voiding, is likely to be
the subject of real dispute and susceptible of proof only after
the most extensive and formal kind of factual investigation.'*
For example, the factual bases for declaring void an incestuous
or a miscegenous marriage should be readily proved; on the oth-
er hand, the sanity or insanity of one of the parties to the mar-
riage, is as litigious an issue as one can conceive. Surely, the
other party to the marriage, should not be allowed to act as
though such marriage were wholly void without a formal ad-
judication on the issue of sanity. In New York, where the
Court of Appeals has refused to treat any annulment as similar
to a divorce, the Court seems disposed to describe all annulment
proceedings thus. Assuming that a marriage, voidable for du-
ress, may have been void at common law, In re Moncrief's Will
describes the effect of their statute making such marriages sub-
ject to annulment, thus:
i"..All that was meant (by saying that the marriage
would be void from the decree) was that no longer might
"2There is still a third possible relationship of "feeble-minded" to "un-
sound mind." The former may be one of the various forms of mental
abnormality covered by the latter generic term. If that is true, some
forms of unsound mind will produce a totally void marriage, while
others will cause only a voidable one.
'Williams v. Williams (1927) 83 Colo. 180, 263 P. 725, quoting 2
KENT'S COM. *76 (12th ed. pp 88-89). 35 AM. Jum., Marriage, §109.
'"Hahn v. Hahn (1918) 104 Wash. 227, 176 P. 3. Washington has a
statute construed in this case which provides: "When there is any
doubt as to the facts rendering a marriage void, either party may ap-
uly for, and on proof obtain, a decree of nullity of marriage." REM.
& BAYL. CODE, §983. Clearly this statute partly recognizes the funda-
mental difference in procedural treatment that should be given dif-
ferent kinds of void marriages. It might well make the application an
exc ugive method for those void marriages difficult of proof.
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husband and wife upon their own responsibility determine
that they were free from the contract. Such a determina-
tion required the concurrence of the court. Only when that
was obtained did the marriage become void. .."
So, whether actually the intention of the amendment to Section
5699 or not, there is an understandable basis for distinguishing
between the methods allowed for declaring a marriage "void"
for insanity, and the other marriages declared void by statute.'
As suggested above, however, if such distinction is recog-
nized at all, it might be thought to require that an exclusive
method be provided for establishing the voidness of a marriage
for insanity--or on the ground that one party had a prior living
spouse at the marriage"' (the other void marriage subject to an-
nulment). Section 5728 provides for an essentially different pro-
cedure for all void marriages, and the California Supreme Court
has assured us that even that procedure is not the only way to
establish a void marriage-that either party's common law right
to ignore it by his own initiative survives.' So, whether Section
5728 overlaps Section 5729 to the extent of the void marriages
covered by the latter Section, will depend on whether the form-
er is applied according to its literal language, or is deemed im-
pliedly limited by Section 5729. Alternative methods for avoid-
ing, certainly already are known in the law, so it would not give
an absurd result to apply these Sections just as they read,'
though there be some overlapping, leaving it to the Legislature
to make it clear that an exclusive procedure was intended for
those void marriages covered by Section 5729. However, the
preferable legislative modification of the existing law would be
to provide that the marriage of a person with any kind of mental
abnormality sufficient to affect the marriage at all would be
""In re Moncrief's Will (1923) 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550.
'Probably it would be a salutary rule repealing the common law right
of either party on their own initiative to consider void any marriage
and to attack such alleged marriage collaterally--so long as the par-
ties are alive. If either party is dead, other interested persons
should be able to raise the question collaterally. Thus conceived, the
"void marriage," would possess practically the same characteristics
as the common law "voidable marriage," except that there would be
no particular presumption as to its validity in the meantime. The
modern voidable marriage would have the same effect, for the most
part, as a divorce.
3'In the latter case, the uncertain factors are two-fold: 1. Was such
person living, and was he a legal spouse at the time? 2. Did the guilty
person act in good faith? Both of these justify requiring a formal
hearing.
"'In re Gregorson's Estate (1911) 160 Cal. 21, 116 P. 60.
'Assuming that "feeble-minded" in §5699 is used generically to de-
scribe all forms of unsound mind.
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voidable only (as was the law under the Field Code), with a
power reserved in the court to declare such marriage void, or
at least to deny to the same party any of the benefits of the
marriage, where the evidence established that such person en-
tered into the marriage solely to become the heir of the insane
person."
VI. CONCLUSION
In seeking to establish that the Montana Code intends that
an annulled marriage shall not be retroactive so as originally to
void the marriage, it has been assumed that all the legal con-
sequences ordinarily flowing from a marriage continue after the
annulment, much the same as a divorce. The characteristic man-
ner for expressing such intention legislatively is to declare that
the annulment shall operate as a divorce. This study has con-
cluded that, as to voidable marriages at least, the law is just that
under the Code, according to accepted statutory construction.
However, it does not intend to ignore the question of whether,
as a matter of legislative policy, an annulled voidable marriage
even, necessarily should have all of those incidents. We have
been concerned particularly with determining the law as it
probably would be applied by the courts. However, it was sug-
gested above that although marriages annulled for insanity
should be declared "voidable" rather than "void," there are
some such marriages wherein the sane spouse should be denied
any marital property rights otherwise accruing to such spouse-
allowing the question to be raised even after the insane spouse's
death. Likewise, there may be some question whether either
spouse in a bigamous marriage should automatically acquire
marital property rights otherwise existing from the second mar-
riage, even where consummated in good faith. Further, our
Court has ruled that, though the wife is entitled to alimony
pendente lite, she is not entitled to permanent alimony after an-
nulment."' Such is the uniform rule outside of statutory modi-
fication."' The conclusions of this paper, though, that the an-
nulment of a voidable marriage operates as a divorce, at least
would justify a reexamination of that question. But that is not
1"4A striking example of the court being granted the power to give ef-
fect to, or to withdraw the Incidents of validity (i.e., to impose the in-
cidents of voidness) is found in New York's statutes empowering the
court to declare the offspring of several different kinds of annullable
marriages legitimate, or illegitimate, according to Its view of the mer-
its of the case. N. Y. C. P. A. §1135.
"'State ex rel. Wooten v. Dist. Ct. of Silver Bow County (1920) 57
Mont 517, 189 P. 233.
"Prince v. Freeman (1941) 45 N. M. 143, 112 P. (2d) 821; 110 A. L. R.
1279 and 1283; note (1939) 23 MINN. L. REv. 387.
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to say that an annulled marriage ought to give rise to such right.
Though the only difference between an annulment of a voidable
marriage and a divorce be as to when the cause therefor arose,
that may well be a sufficient reason to permit alimony in the
one case and deny it in the other. For example, if the only
cause for complaint is that the defendant defrauded the com-
plainant in some manner, to induce the marriage, though the de-
frauded person be given a personal right to avoid, it may be
doubted that the right to continuous support thereafter should
survive avoidance.
This is a complex and difficult question. The fact is that
both the lawyer's and the layman's habit'" of thinking in terms
of extreme opposites-wholly void or wholly valid (as to the in-
cidents traditionally accompanying those concepts) ; pure black
or pure white-are not adequate to the present problem. Just
assuming either that an annulled marriage must be given all the
attributes of a divorced marriage, or that it can have none of
those attributes, certainly furnishes no catalyst for a just result.
Greater particularization is needed. Very possibly a court will
not feel that it is within its province to effect such functional
changes.'" It is hoped that, in the not too distant future, the
Legislature will give serious and intelligent attention to the sub-
ject of annulment, with its allied problems.
'"Similarly, the expressions by court clerks, as well as some social wel-
fare workers indicate that they assume that a strict unalterable rule
prohibiting marriages below certain ages, with other rules imposing
stringent consequences upon all persons concerned, for a violation of
such age limits is the Utopian form of marriage law. They seem to
be little concerned with those cases where both the natural parents and
their parents are anxious to protect an expected child by making him
legitimate through its parents' marriage, though one such parent is
below the age of consent. Not one court clerk answering the ques-
tionnaire mentioned supra note 68, objects to the law as it has been
interpreted in the past, applied to these facts. There are many ways
of imposing penalties upon the principals to such illicit acts, other
than making the offspring suffer.
'"That the doctrine of void ab initio will not be too rigorously and me-
chanically applied even in those states most vigorously adhering to it,
even without statutory aid, is indicated in a leading New York case
which states through Justice Cardozo that the doctrine ".. is not...
without limits prescribed by policy and justice.... ".Sleicher v.
Sleicher (1929) 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501, 502. Note (1929) 39 YALE
L. JRNL. 133, commenting on Cardozo's pronouncement says that
" ..if in application it (limit on relation back) reaches the result
that ...the retroactive effect of an annulment decree shall not be
permitted to work inequity as to innocent third parties, it may render
remedial legislation unnecessary in the future.... . And see note
(1930) 30 COL. L. Rzv. 877, and cases there cited, some of which rule
that even void marriages have some of the incidents of a valid mar-
riage. See note 106 supra.
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